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The high bar of proof to demonstrate either a disparate treatment or disparate 
impact cause of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, coupled with the “black box” 
nature of many automated hiring systems, renders the detection and redress of bias in such 
algorithmic systems difficult. This Article, with contributions at the intersection of 
administrative law, employment & labor law, and law & technology, makes the central 
claim that the automation of hiring both facilitates and obfuscates employment discrimination. 
That phenomenon and the deployment of intellectual property law as a shield against the 
scrutiny of automated systems combine to form an insurmountable obstacle for disparate 
impact claimants. 
To ensure against the identified “bias in, bias out” phenomenon associated with 
automated decision-making, I argue that the employer’s affirmative duty of care as posited by 
other legal scholars creates “an auditing imperative” for algorithmic hiring systems. This 
auditing imperative mandates both internal and external audits of automated hiring systems, 
as well as record-keeping initiatives for job applications. Such audit requirements have 
precedent in other areas of law, as they are not dissimilar to the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) audits in labor law or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act audit 
requirements in securities law.  
I also propose that employers that have subjected their automated hiring platforms 
to external audits could receive a certification mark, “the Fair Automated Hiring Mark,” 
which would serve to positively distinguish them in the labor market. Labor law mechanisms 
such as collective bargaining could be an effective approach to combating the bias in automated 
hiring by establishing criteria for the data deployed in automated employment decision-making 
and creating standards for the protection and portability of said data. The Article concludes 
by noting that automated hiring, which captures a vast array of applicant data, merits greater 
legal oversight given the potential for “algorithmic blackballing,” a phenomenon that could 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine this scenario: A woman seeking a retail job is informed that the 
job can only be applied for online. The position is a sales clerk for a retail 
company with store hours from 9:00 AM to 9:00 PM. She is interested in the 
morning and afternoon hours, as she has children who are in school until 3:00 
PM. When completing the application, she reaches a screen where she is 
prompted to register her hours of availability. She enters 9:00 AM to 3:00 PM, 
Monday through Friday. However, when she hits the button to advance to the 
next screen, she receives an error message indicating that she has not 
completed the current section. She refreshes her screen, she re-starts her 
computer, and still the same error message remains. Finally, in frustration, she 
abandons the application. Compare the above to this second scenario: A fifty-
three-year-old man is applying for a job that requires a college degree. But 
when he attempts to complete the application online, he finds that the drop-
down menu offers only college graduation dates that go back to the year 2000. 
The automated hiring platform will, in effect, exclude many applicants who are 
older than forty years old. If the man also chooses to forgo the application like 
the woman in the previous scenario, the automated hiring system may not 
retain any record of the two failed attempts to complete the job application.1 
 The vignettes above reflect the real-life experiences of job applicants who 
must now contend with automated hiring systems in their bid for 
employment. 2  These stories illustrate the potential for automated hiring 
systems to discreetly and disproportionately cull the applications of job seekers 
who are from legally protected classes. 3  Given that legal scholars have 
identified a “bias in, bias out” problem for automated decision-making, 4 
automated hiring as a socio-technical trend challenges the American bedrock 
ideal of equal opportunity in employment,5 as such automated practices may 
not only be deployed to exclude certain categories of workers but may also be 
 
1 See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA 
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016). 
2 Patricia G. Barnes, Behind the Scenes, Discrimination by Job Search Engines, AGE 
DISCRIMINATION EMP. (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.agediscriminationinemployment.com/tag/illinois-attorney-general-lisa-
madigan/ [https://perma.cc/6H7Z-WSDD]; Ifeoma Ajunwa & Daniel Greene, Platforms at 
Work: Data Intermediaries in the Organization of the Workplace, in WORK AND LABOR IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE (2019) (discussing the encountered difficulty of completing an online 
application when applying with constrained hours of availability).  
3 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 guarantees equal opportunity in employment 
irrespective of race, gender, and other protected characteristics. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17 (2000). 
4 See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2224 (2019) (arguing that the 
problem of disparate impact in predictive risk algorithms lies not in the algorithmic system 
but in the nature of prediction itself); Sonia Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial 
Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 58 (2019) (noting the bias that exists within AI systems and 
arguing for private mechanisms to govern AI systems); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 
69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 87 (2017) (“This new family of algorithms hold enormous promise, 
but also poses new and unusual dangers.”).  
5 Ajunwa & Greene, supra note 2; see also Pauline Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 860 (2017) [hereinafter Data-Driven Discrimination at Work]. 
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used to justify the inclusion of other classes as more “fit” for the job.6 This is 
a cause for the legal concern that algorithms may be used to manipulate the 
labor market in ways that negate equal employment opportunity.7 This concern 
is further exacerbated given that nearly all Fortune 500 companies now use 
algorithmic recruitment and hiring tools.8 Algorithmic hiring has also saturated 
the low-wage retail market, with the top twenty Fortune 500 companies, which 
are mostly retail and commerce companies that boast large numbers of 
employees, almost exclusively hiring through online platforms.9  
 Although it is undeniable that there could be tangible economic benefits 
of adopting automated decision-making, 10  the received wisdom of the 
objectivity of automated decision-making, coupled with an unquestioning 
acceptance of the results of algorithmic decision-making,11 have allowed hiring 
systems to proliferate without adequate legal oversight. As Professor Margot 
Kaminski notes, addressing algorithmic decision-making concerns requires 
both individual and systemic approaches. 12  Currently, the algorithmic 
decisions made in the private sector are largely unregulated, and Kaminski 
argues for a collaborative approach to governance that could satisfy both 
individual and collective concerns: 
  
Collaborative governance is a middle ground, a third way, that aims to 
harness the benefits of self-regulation without its pitfalls. The government 
stays significantly involved as a backdrop threat to nudge private sector 
involvement, as a forum for convening and empowering conflicting voices, 
as an arbiter or certifier in the name of the public interest, and as a hammer 
that can come down to enforce compliance.13 
 
 Thus, the goal of this Article is neither to argue against or for the use of 
automated decision-making in employment, nor is it to examine whether 
automated hiring systems are better than humans at making hiring decisions. 
For antidiscrimination law, the efficacy of any particular hiring system is a 
secondary concern to ensuring that any such system does not unlawfully 
 
6 See Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1671, 1671 (2020). 
7 See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 996, 999 (2014); 
Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 165 (2017); Tal Z. 
Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 157, 158, 
160–61 (2019); Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: 
Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 2, 10 (2019); Pauline Kim, 
Manipulating Opportunity, 106 VA. L. REV. 867, 869 (2020). 
8 LINDA BARBER, INST. FOR EMP. STUD., E-RECRUITMENT DEVELOPMENTS 3 (2006). 
9 Ajunwa & Greene, supra note 2, at 71–72. 
10 See infra Section I.A. 
11 See Ajunwa, supra note 6, at 1684–85. 
12 See Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic 
Accountability, 92 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1529, 1533 (2019). 
13 Id. at 1561. 
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discriminate against protected categories.14 Therefore, my aim is to suggest 
collaborative regulatory regimes for automated hiring systems that will ensure 
that any benefits of automated hiring are not negated by (un)intended 
outcomes, such as unlawful discrimination on the basis of protected 
characteristics. 
 Furthermore, this Article owes a debt to Professor Katherine Strandburg,      
who notes that explainability has important normative and practical 
implications for system design.15 Specifically, Strandburg notes that inscrutable 
decision tools disrupt the explanatory flows among the multiple actors 
responsible for determining goals, selecting decision criteria, and applying 
those criteria.16 Thus, seeking the explainability of automated decisions is not 
just for the benefit of the decision subjects, but really for the benefit of all 
interested in the outcomes.17  
 In a similar vein, Talia Gillis and Josh Simons have argued against focusing 
on accountability of individual actors.18 Rather, they note that “[t]he focus on 
individual, technical explanations . . . [is] driven by an uncritical bent towards 
transparency.”19 Instead, they advocate that “[i]nstitutions should justify their 
choices about the design and integration of machine learning models not to 
individuals, but to empowered regulators or other forms of public oversight 
bodies.” 20  
 Furthermore, Professor Pauline Kim makes the case that the law does 
allow for the revision of algorithmic systems to address bias.21 Thus, she argues 
that the law permits using auditing to detect and correct for discriminatory 
bias.22 Kim argues that auditing should be an important strategy for examining 
whether the outcomes of automated hiring systems comport with equal 
opportunity in employment guidelines.23  
 The insights of these legal scholars and others24 form the foundation for 
my contribution in this Article, in which I posit an auditing imperative for 
 
14 As Professor Charles Sullivan notes: “[T]he antidiscrimination statutes don’t really care 
whether any particular selection device actually improves productivity so long as it does not 
discriminate.” Charles Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 398 (2018). 
15 Katherine Strandburg, Rulemaking and Inscrutable Automated Decision Tools, 119 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1851, 1867–72 (2019).  
16 See id. at 1851. 
17 See id. at 1857–58; see also Deirdre K. Mulligan, Daniel N. Kluttz & Nitin Kohli, Shaping 
Our Tools: Contestability as a Means to Promote Responsible Algorithmic Decision Making in the 
Professions, in AFTER THE DIGITAL TORNADO (Kevin Werbach ed., 2020).  
18 See Talia Gillis & Josh Simons, Explanation < Justification: GDPR and the Perils of Privacy, 2 
J.L. & INNOVATION 71 (2019). 
19 Id. at 76. 
20 Id. at 81.  
21 Pauline Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 191 
(2017) [hereinafter Auditing Algorithms] (responding to Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, 
Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan 
Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 636 (2017)). 
22 See id. at 197–99. 
23 See id. at 202. 
24 See Bryan Casey, Ashkon Farhangi & Roland Vogl, Rethinking Explainable Machines: The 
GDPR’s “Right to Explanation” Debate and the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in Enterprise, 34 
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automated hiring systems. Building on Professor Kim’s essay, I argue not just 
that the law allows for the audits, but that the spirit of antidiscrimination law 
requires it. That is, I follow the footsteps of legal scholars like Professors 
Richard Thompson Ford, 25  James Grimmelmann, 26  Robert Post, 27  David 
Benjamin Oppenheimer, 28  and Noah Zatz, 29  to argue that employment 
antidiscrimination law imposes an affirmative duty of care on employers to 
ensure that they are avoiding practices that would constrain equal opportunity 
in employment. Thus, I argue, that when employers choose to use algorithmic 
systems, fulfilling their duty of care entails regular audits of those systems. In 
turn, audits necessitate the record-keeping and data retention mandates that I 
also propose in this Article.   
 I note here that automated hiring systems exist in a plethora of forms, with 
each iteration presenting distinct legal issues. This is because each form of 
automated hiring does not offer the same level of automation. Ranging from 
the least automated (which allows for the most human intervention) to the 
most automated (which allows for the least human intervention), there are: 
applicant tracking systems (“ATS”), which employ algorithms that parse 
resumes for keywords;30 machine learning algorithms that could be trained on 
selecting resumes and deployed to rank them in hundreds or thousands;31 and 
video screening systems, such as HireVue, which provide automated 
assessments based on facial analysis and vocal indications.32 To offer a full 
portrait of the proliferation of automated hiring platforms and associated legal 
issues, the Appendix offers a survey of extant automated hiring systems in 
which I detail a sampling of the companies currently using those systems, as 
well as their potentially problematic features. This Article does not delve into 
the specific legal issues associated with each iteration of automated hiring 
 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 143, 153–68 (2019). Other scholars have thought about audits in the 
GDPR context, but I bring the idea of audits to the American employment and labor law 
context. 
25 See Richard Thompson Ford, Rethinking Rights after the Second Reconstruction, 132 YALE L.J. 
2942 (2014) [hereinafter Rethinking Rights]; see also Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air: 
Rethinking Employment Discrimination Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1381 (2014) [hereinafter Bias in 
the Air]. 
26 See James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination,  
7 CALIF. L. REV. 164, 171–74 (2017).  
27 See Robert Post, 1998–99 Brennan Center Symposium Lecture: Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic 
of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 36 (2000). 
28 See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993) 
[hereinafter "Negligent Discrimination]. 
29 See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the 
Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2009) [hereinafter 
Managing the Macaw]. 
30 See, e.g., CLEVERSTAFF, https://cleverstaff.net [https://perma.cc/2KBM-5VQH]. 
31 Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against Women, 
REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2018, 10:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com- jobs-
automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against- 
women-idUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/6SA7-R35L] (“[A]mazon’s computer models 
were trained to vet applicants by observing patterns in resumes submitted to the company 
over a 10-year period. Most came from men, a reflection of male dominance across the tech 
industry.”).  
32 See HIREVUE, http://hirevue.com [https://perma.cc/QLH3-QXQM]. 
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system; rather, it recognizes that all job applications share several common 
legal problems regardless of which iteration of automated hiring system applies, 
and that the greatest obstacle is meeting the standard of proof for employment 
discrimination. 
 But first, consider the growing trend towards automated video interview 
assessment as perhaps the most extreme of automated hiring systems. 
According to one article, one of the leaders in the automated video interview 
market, HireVue, “uses AI to analyze word choice, tone, and facial movement 
of job applicants who do video interviews.”33 For some candidates, such video 
assessments recall an approach34  to hiring that is reminiscent of Frederik 
Winslow Taylor’s time series experiments on factory workers.35 Relating his 
experience with HireVue, one candidate whose answers were interrupted by a 
timer noted: “You just see yourself and a stopwatch ticking down.”36 But the 
destabilizing effect of timed responses is not the greatest problem associated 
with automated video interviewing. As researchers have noted, many of these 
systems are trained on white male faces and voices, which poses a problem for 
any applicants who diverge from that norm.37 Thus, applicants who are white 
women or racial minorities may have their facial expressions or tone of voice 
mischaracterized by automated video interviewing platforms.38 
 Other important concerns raised by critics of automated video 
interviewing systems are: the collection of the applicant’s personal data, the 
“black box” nature of how such information is used, 39 and a lack of worker’s 
agency and control over the portability of the data. As Dan Lyons notes in his 
book, Lab Rats: 
 
 
33 Richard Feloni, I Tried the Software That Uses AI to Scan Job Applicants for Companies Like 
Goldman Sachs and Unilever Before Meeting Them — and It’s Not as Creepy as It Sounds., BUS. 
INSIDER (Aug. 23, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/hirevue-ai-powered-
job-interview-platform-2017-8 [https://perma.cc/3R8D-Y6QN]. 
34 See generally FREDERIK WINSLOW TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 
(1911); Cf.Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Joel Ford, Health and Big Data: An Ethical 
Framework for Health Information Collection by Corporate Wellness Programs, 44 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
474 (2016) (positing that workforce science, as an iteration of Taylorism, now focuses on the 
worker’s body rather than the job task). 
35 See, e.g., Rebecca Greenfield, The Rise of the (Truly Awful) Webcam Job Interview, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 12, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-12/the-rise-
of-the-truly-awful-webcam-job-interview [https://perma.cc/M93J-QTY8]. 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., Tess Townsend, Most Engineers Are White — and So Are the Faces That They Use to 
Train Software, VOX: RECODE (Jan. 18, 2017, 11:45 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2017/1/18/14304964/data-facial-recognition-trouble-recognizing-
black-white-faces-diversity [https://perma.cc/HG4C-SEP6] (“A lack of diversity in the 
training set leads to an inability to easily characterize faces that do not fit the normal face 
derived from the training set.” (emphasis omitted)). 
38 See Thor Benson, Your Next Job Interview Could Be with a Racist Bot, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 20, 
2018, 11:01 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/your-next-job-interview-could-be-with-a-
racist-bot [https://perma.cc/QRG3-D3WU]. 
39 See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 16 (2015) (arguing that unregulated and opaque data 
collection is contributing to social inequality). 
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HireVue’s robot recruiting system is building a database of deep, rich 
psychographic information on millions of people. Moreover, the data 
is not anonymous. Your psychographic blueprint is connected to all of 
your personal information — name, address, email, phone number, 
work history, education. And they have you on video. Everything you 
say in an interview can follow you around for the rest of your life.40 
 
Yet, there are no federal regulations as to the collection, storage, or use of data 
from automated hiring platforms, and in effect, employers have carte blanche to 
adopt self-serving practices.41 
 In their seminal essay on privacy law, Samuel D. Warren and Louis L. 
Brandeis argue that Americans should have the “right to be let alone.”42 The 
scholars start by writing “[t]hat the individual shall have full protection in 
person and in property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been 
found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent 
of such protection.”43 Thus, they suggest molding common law to fit the 
times — including the political, social, and economic changes that regularly 
occur.44 I note here the growing tendency to deny this “right to be let alone” 
to workers. Increasingly, workers are being called upon to exchange their 
privacy for the mere opportunity to be considered for employment.45 With 
recent technological advances in automated hiring, and especially given the 
current trend towards automated video interviewing which accumulates even 
more data about the candidate’s person than could have previously been 
imagined, employment antidiscrimination law is in dire need of updates. In this 
Article, I argue that such updates to the law should not just acknowledge the 
auditing imperative, but also recognize worker’s agency to control the end uses 
and portability of data (much of it now biometric) subsumed by the 
algorithmic hiring apparatus.46  
In this context, it is alarming that a recent study by the Pew Research 
Center found that most Americans underestimate the prevalence of these 
automated hiring platforms in the workplace.47 The study revealed that “fewer 
 
40 DAN LYONS, LAB RATS: HOW SILICON VALLEY MADE WORK MISERABLE FOR THE REST 
OF US 181 (2019) (ebook). 
41 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in 
the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1160 (2017) (“Despite this interpretive 
limitation, machine-learning algorithms have been implemented widely in private-sector 
settings. Companies desire the savings in costs and efficiency gleaned from these 
techniques.”).  




45 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CAL. L. 
REV. 735, 736 (2017). 
46 See infra Parts III, IV. 
47 AARON SMITH & MONICA ANDERSON, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AUTOMATION IN 
EVERYDAY LIFE 50 (2017), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/14/2017/10/03151500/PI_2017.10.04_Automation_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D4E4-B47W]. 
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than half of Americans are familiar with the concept of computer programs 
that can review job applications without any human involvement.”48 In fact, 
57% of Americans say that they have heard nothing at all about automated 
hiring platforms in the past. 49  Of the respondents who were aware of 
automated hiring systems, 76% stated that they would not want to apply for 
jobs through such a system.50 The given reasons for that response varied, but 
most commonly, the individuals expressed the belief that computer systems 
could not capture everything about an applicant.51 One woman wrote, “[a] 
computer cannot measure the emotional intelligence or intangible assets that 
many humans have.”52 Another stated, “I do believe that hiring people requires 
a fair amount of judgment and intuition that is not well automated.”53 On the 
other side of this spectrum, however, 22% of the individuals surveyed reported 
that they would want to apply for jobs that use a computer program to make 
hiring decisions.54 The most common rationale for this response was the belief 
that software would be less biased than human reviewers.55 
 I have previously argued that a misguided belief in the objectivity of 
automated decision-making has ushered in automated hiring as an anti-bias 
intervention.56 I have further argued that the framing of discovered bias in 
automated decision-making systems as a technical problem, rather than a legal 
problem, has stymied attempts at solving the problem.57 Professor Sandra 
Mayson has also argued that “the source of racial inequality in risk assessment 
[which is a type of automated decision-making] lies neither in the input data, 
nor in a particular algorithm, nor in algorithmic methodology per se.”58 Rather, 
“the deep problem is the nature of prediction itself. All prediction looks to the 
past to make guesses about future events. In a racially stratified world, any 
method of prediction will project the inequalities of the past into the future.”59 
For automated decision-making in employment, I argue that not only is the 
nature of prediction problematic (particularly given historical employment 
discrimination), but also, the manner in which such prediction is accomplished 
further creates opportunities for unlawful discrimination and exclusion. 
 I identify four major problems with automated hiring: 1) the design 
features of automated hiring platforms may enable them to serve as culling 
systems that discreetly eliminate applicants from protected categories without 
retaining a record; 2) automated hiring systems that allow for the deployment 
of proxies for protected categories, like gender or race, can be used to present 








54 Id.  
55 Id. 
56 Ajunwa, supra note 6, at 1671. 
57 Id. 
58 See Mayson, supra note 4, at 2218. 
59 Id. 
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specifically trade secret, protects automated hiring systems from outside 
scrutiny and allows discrimination to go undetected; and 4) a worker’s lack of 
control over the portability of applicant data captured by automated hiring 
systems increases the chance of repeated employment discrimination, thus 
raising the specter of an algorithmically permanently excluded class60 of job 
applicants, meaning that certain applicants might find themselves 
“algorithmically blackballed.”61  
 When it comes to litigation to redress employment discrimination, these 
problematic features of automated hiring present obstacles to workers: 1) At 
higher levels of automation, it becomes difficult to determine intent to 
discriminate, which is required for finding liability under the disparate 
treatment cause of action under Title VII;62 2) when bringing suit under the 
disparate impact cause of action, the design features of automated hiring 
systems, as well as trade secret claims that may arise, impede the plaintiff’s 
ability to provide the statistical proof required to establish a prima facie case; 
and 3) litigation remedies in employment antidiscrimination law do not address 
privacy and discrimination issues associated with the collection of personal and 
biometric data from job candidates, as enabled by automated video 
interviewing. I argue then that employment law, with its emphasis on litigation 
as redress for employment discrimination, is limited in its capacity to address 
the full spectrum of identified problems with automated hiring. 
 This Article pushes the boundaries of existing employment law scholarship 
by proposing alternative approaches to solving the issue of bias in automated 
employment decision-making, in addition to offering methods for 
strengthening existing litigation redress mechanisms. Alternative approaches 
to litigation represent an important contribution given that employment 
discrimination plaintiffs generally do not fare well in court. 63 Thus, I argue that 
 
60 Richard A. Bales & Katherine V.W. Stone, The Invisible Web at Work: Artificial Intelligence and 
Electronic Surveillance in the Workplace, 41 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 1 (2020) (“The data 
collected is transformed by means of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms into a permanent 
electronic resume that can identify and predict an individual’s performance as well as their 
work ethic, personality, union proclivity, employer loyalty, and future health care costs.”). 
61 See infra Section IV.C.4. 
62 Charles Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 397 (2018) (exploring the legal 
difficulties of assigning intent to a machine learning automated hiring system, when the 
machine can learn from previous decisions and write its own follow-on models). 
63 See Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither 
McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1944 (2004) (“The 5.8% reversal rate of 
defendant trial victories is smaller in employment discrimination cases than any other 
category of cases except prisoner habeas corpus trials.”); see also Ruth Colker, The Americans 
with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 99, 100 n.9 (1999) 
(finding that between 1992 and 1998, defendants prevailed in more than 92% of cases 
decided at the trial court level and were more likely to be affirmed on appeal); Theodore 
Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 
1567, 1578 (1989) (noting that only claims filed by prisoners have a lower success rate than 
that of employment discrimination plaintiffs); cf. Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment 
Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 937, 938 
(2014) (“Employment discrimination law has long been ripe for updating. Many of the core 
cases regarding how discrimination is defined and proved arose in the 1970s in a very 
different era and were designed to address very different kinds of discrimination.”). 
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administrative measures, such as mandated audits, are necessary and currently 
under-utilized means for achieving the bedrock legal principle of equal 
opportunity in employment. Similarly, labor law processes, such as collective 
bargaining, have also been found to influence business practices for the better64 
and could be instrumental in both clarifying workers’ rights and delineating 
employers’ responsibilities under an automated hiring regime. 
 The Article is then organized as follows. Part I reviews the business case 
for automated hiring as well as the potential for misuse of automated hiring 
systems. Part II parses some solutions that focus on some of the technological 
shortcomings of automated hiring systems and notes the limitations of such 
techno-solutionist approaches. Part III discusses the gaps in current 
employment law framework for addressing bias in automated hiring — 
notably, disparate impact claims present a high hurdle for plaintiffs, especially 
in the case of automated hiring systems when the means of proof is solely 
under the control of the employer. Part IV examines the potential for a hybrid 
approach to tackling bias in employment discrimination that combines ex post 
approaches (in particular internal and external auditing mandates) with ex ante 
approaches, such as 1) contractual protections for employers who rely on 
vendor representations of bias reduction, 2) fairness-by-design principles that 
could be implemented as part of Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) guidelines to prevent discrimination in automated hiring, and 3) 
collective bargaining that would address both data input into automated hiring 
systems and worker control over the afterlife of the data created by these 
systems. 
 
I. AUTOMATED HIRING AS BUSINESS PRACTICE 
 In this Part, I discuss the business case for the trend towards automated 
hiring. I also note the potential for automated hiring systems to be misused to 
produce unlawful employment discrimination. Furthermore, I describe how 
such systems may serve to mask employment discrimination or impede its 
detection. 
A.The Business Case 
 Automated hiring systems have proliferated because they are perceived as 
both cost-effective and efficient. A Forbes article notes that artificial 
intelligence (“AI”) will quickly emerge as a key tool for human resources 
(“HR”) because of the current talent scarcity and low unemployment. 65 
 
64 See Alison D. Morantz, What Unions Do for Regulation, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 515, 
527–28 (2017) (surveying literature from an array of regulatory domains — 
antidiscrimination, environmental protection, product quality, corporate governance, law 
enforcement, tax compliance, minimum wage and overtime protection, and occupational 
safety and health — to show that unions tend to increase the level of regulatory compliance). 
65 Gal Almog, Recruiting Isn’t Enough: How AI Is Changing the Rules in the Human Capital Market, 
FORBES (Feb. 9, 2018, 8:50 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2018/02/09/traditional-recruiting-isnt-enough-
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Companies on average spend approximately four thousand dollars per 
candidate on the hiring process, including interviewing, scheduling, and 
conducting assessments.66 However, the adoption of automated hiring makes 
the hiring process much less costly. This might be why, according to a Deloitte 
Bersin report, companies that use technologies, such as AI and predictive data 
analytics, are more successful than those who do not.67 For instance, one 
report indicates that the companies using AI technology show 18% higher 
revenue and 30% greater profitability compared to those without the tools.68 
 A report by Ideal demonstrates how automated hiring allows companies 
to be efficient in hiring by detailing the time commitment required for 
traditional hiring.69 On average, companies spend fourteen hours per week 
manually completing tasks that could be automated.70 Twenty-eight percent 
indicate that they spend twenty hours or more, and 11% spend thirty hours or 
more on such tasks.71 Also, 41% of HR managers say not fully automating their 
manual hiring processes has led to lower productivity, and 35% have 
experienced higher costs for the same reason.72 In addition to lower efficiency 
and productivity, not fully automating manual processes in HR seems to have 
affected hiring decisions regarding the best talent, as 17% of HR managers 
state that it has led to a poor candidate experience.73 
 Other articles also tout the benefits of adopting automated hiring 
processes. For instance, a LinkedIn Talent Blog post claims that a recruiting 
algorithm increases the accuracy of selecting productive employees by more 
than 50%.74 An article by Monster.com, a global employment website, boasts 




66 See id. (citing DELOITTE DEVELOPMENT LLC, THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: 
2018 DELOITTE GLOBAL HUMAN CAPITAL TRENDS (2018),  
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/HumanCapital/gx-
hc-trends-rise-social-enterprise.pdf [https://perma.cc/XU3N-2QXR]). 
67 See Almog, supra note 65 (citing DELOITTE DEVELOPMENT LLC, supra note 66). 
68 See DENISE MOULTON & ROBIN ERICKSON, USING TALENT ACQUISITION TO DRIVE 
CRITICAL TALENT RESULT 2–3 (2018), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/human-capital/us-hc-
using-talent-acquisition-to-drive-critical-talent-results.pdf [https://perma.cc/8APZ-ZGJC]; 
see also Almog, supra note 65. 
69 Ji-A Min, 12 Revealing Stats on How Recruiters Feel About AI, IDEAL (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://ideal.com/how-recruiters-feel-about-ai/ [https://perma.cc/RLZ8-DT6L]. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 Maren Hogan, 8 Hiring Stats That Will Change the Way You Recruit, LINKEDIN: TALENT 
BLOG (Sept. 8, 2016), https://business.linkedin.com/talent-solutions/blog/trends-and-
research/2016/8-hiring-stats-that-will-change-the-way-you-recruit-today 
[https://perma.cc/3N4X-WEJD]; see also Roy Maurer, Using Data to Make Better Hires, SHRM 
(Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/talent-
acquisition/pages/using-data-make-better-hires.aspx [https://perma.cc/49DA-G2PP] 
(citing Nathan R. Kuncel, Deniz S. Ones & David M. Klieger, In Hiring, Algorithms Beat 
Instinct, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/05/in-hiring-algorithms-beat-
instinct [https://perma.cc/5Y9P-C6XD]). 
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with a median reduction of 38%. 75  Furthermore, in the article In Hiring, 
Algorithms Beat Instinct, the authors argue that hiring algorithms produce more 
objective outcomes than do human decision-makers.76 The authors note that 
although humans are adept at specifying qualifications for a job and drawing 
out information from candidates, HR managers find it difficult to weigh the 
results;77 according to one analysis, a simple equation performed better than 
human decisions, regardless of the number of candidates and types of jobs.78 
Another study found that although hiring managers can be greatly familiar with 
their organizations and have more insight beyond a two-dimensional job 
description, they are also easily distracted by marginal things, such as applicants’ 
compliments, and “use information inconsistently.”79 Yet another study found 
that a job-screening algorithm “favored ‘nontraditional’ candidates” much 
more than human screeners did, “exhibit[ing] significantly less bias against 
candidates that were underrepresented at the firm.”80 Some other algorithmic 
studies related to credit applications, criminal justice, public resource 
allocations, and corporate governance all concluded that “[a]lgorithms are less 
biased and more accurate than the humans they are replacing.”81 
 Given these results, some legal scholars have challenged the focus of legal 
scholarship on the bias discovered in automated decision-making. 82 As these 
scholars argue, the original intent of automated decision-making is “to 
improve upon human decision-making by suppressing biases to make the most 
efficient and least discriminatory decisions.” 83  Thus, arguably, there is no 
implicit promise that automated decision-making could eliminate all bias; 
rather, the function of automated decision-making is merely to improve upon 
human decision-making. This assertion should be accepted at face value. My 
purpose for this Article is not to argue that automated decision-making can or 
should eliminate all bias in decision-making; rather, my aim is to argue that 
automated decision-making, even when it does offer some improvement on 
human decision-making, still merits legal oversight,84 particularly when such 
decision-making holds the potential to limit the access to earning a livelihood 
for people of protected categories. 
 
75 John Rossheim, Algorithmic Hiring: Why Hire by Numbers?, MONSTER, 
https://hiring.monster.com/hr/hr-best-practices/recruiting-hiring-advice/strategic-
workforce-planning/hiring-algorithms.aspx [https://perma.cc/7MD2-4F6J]. 
76 See Kuncel, Ones & Klieger, supra note 74. 
77 Id. 
78 See id. (“Our analysis of 17 studies of applicant evaluations shows that a simple equation 
outperforms human decisions by at least 25%. The effect holds in any situation with a large 
number of candidates, regardless of whether the job is on the front line, in middle 
management, or (yes) in the C-suite.”). 
79 See id. 




82 See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 520 (2018). 
83 Id. at 520. 
84 Professor Julie Cohen has extensively made the point that automated systems merit greater 
legal oversight in her breadth of scholarship. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 7. 
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B. How Automated Is Automated Hiring? 
 Although this Article uses the term “automated hiring,” I contend that this 
term can be misleading as it elides the continued role of human input, the 
human hand. As I have previously noted, to argue against or for automated 
decision-making versus human decision-making rests on the false assumption 
that the two could be wholly disentangled. 85  As Professor Mayson notes, 
automated decision-making is merely a reflection of all past decisions: 
 
All prediction functions like a mirror. . . . Algorithmic prediction 
produces a precise reflection of digital data. Subjective prediction 
produces a cloudy reflection of anecdotal data. But the nature of the 
analysis is the same. To predict the future under status quo conditions 
is simply to project history forward.86      
 
 I agree here with the conclusion that algorithmic decision-making posits 
history as the best diviner of the future, but I also urge for a better 
understanding of how human decision-making remains entangled in 
automated decision-making. Such an understanding, I believe, would help to 
quell the reification of automated decision-making as better than human 
decision-making and also to negate what I call “automation exceptionalism,” 
which is the idea that automated decision-making is somehow set apart and 
should not be subjected to the same scrutiny or skepticism as human decision-
making. 
 To  illustrate this point, I point to the example of Amazon’s experience 
with one hiring algorithm.87 In that case, a whistleblower revealed that Amazon 
had created and then abandoned an automated hiring system that was 
returning biased results for women candidates.88 I cannot believe that Amazon 
would build an automated hiring system to intentionally discriminate against 
women, yet that is alleged to have happened in practice.89  
 Most automated decision-making require human input at some stage. 
Some might argue that a crucial stage is ex post, when human interveners may 
choose to ignore or make exceptions for the automated result. However, note 
that for all automated decision-making, there is always ex ante human input, 
when human decision-making directly dictates the design of the automated 
decision-making system, including deciding what variables should be 
considered, and deciding how said variables should be measured. In the 
Amazon case, albeit that there was no intention to discriminate, one possible 
 
85 Ajunwa, supra note 6, at 1711, 1718. 
86 Mayson, supra note 4, at 2224. 
87 Isobel Asher Hamilton, Amazon Built an AI Tool to Hire People but Had to Shut It 
Down Because It Was Discriminating Against Women, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2018, 
5:47 AM), www.businessinsider.com/amazon-built-ai-to-hire-people-discriminated-
against-women-2018- 10  
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
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cause for the discriminatory results is human intervention in the way the 
computer models were trained.90  Thus, despite some of the proven benefits 
of automated hiring, there remains the potential for misuse, resulting from the 
opportunities to introduce human bias at any stage of the automated hiring 
process — from design, to implementation, and finally, to the interpretation 
of results. 
 
C. Potential for Misuse 
Although automated hiring offers some business utility, the potential for 
the misuse of algorithmic hiring to accomplish (un)intended unlawful 
discriminatory results remains. Hiring technologies can play various roles in 
the process; for example, in the early stages of recruiting, automated 
predictions can “steer job advertisements and personalized job 
recommendations to jobseekers from particular demographic groups.”91 Also, 
although employers might adopt hiring technology to “increase efficiency, and 
in hopes that they will find more successful – and sometimes, more diverse – 
employees,”92  this might be a superficial stop gap to addressing issues of 
inequity embedded in organizational practices. Thus, the belief that recruiters 
will be able to “make fairer and more holistic hiring decisions” because the 
tools will “reduce bias by obscuring applicants’ sensitive characteristics,” 93 
centers on individual human prejudice, while obviating institutional, structural, 
and other forms of bias that become systemic in any given organization.94 To 
illustrate the historical and structural nature of bias in hiring, consider this: “[A] 
company that tends to hire from a privileged and homogeneous community 
and then uses ‘culture fit’ as a factor in hiring decisions could end up 
methodically rejecting otherwise qualified candidates who come from more 
diverse backgrounds.”95 
 The fact remains that there are myriad ways that automated hiring could 
systematically replicate biases that have calcified from organizational practice.96 
 
90 See, Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 
Cardozo, L. Rev. 1671, 1674  (2020) (In which I describe the Amazon case. “A potential 
cause: The computer models were trained on predominantly male resumes, with the result 
that the system concluded that men were preferred candidates; thus, it “downgraded 
résumés containing the word ‘women’s’ and filtered out candidates who had attended two 
women-only colleges.” Id. 
91 MIRANDA BOGEN & AARON RIEKE, UPTURN, HELP WANTED: AN EXAMINATION OF 




92 Id. at 6. 
93 Id. at 7. 
94 For example, Professor Pauline Kim argues: “algorithms will not counteract structural 
forms of workplace bias.” DATA-DRIVEN DISCRIMINATION AT WORK, supra note 5, at 871. 
95 BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 96, at 7. 
96 As other scholars have argued: “It should not be surprising that trying to predict qualities 
of good future workers based on the qualities of current workers and existing work culture 
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First, if the training data for a model is itself inaccurate, non-representative, or 
biased, the resulting model and the predictions could reflect skewed results.97 
Second, a phenomenon known as “automation bias” occurs when people 
“give undue weight to the information coming through their monitors.”98 A 
third issue is when algorithms are trained to evaluate the criteria used for 
selection in a manner that benefits one group of applicants. This is especially 
true for automated video interviewing which is the latest trend in automated 
hiring. 
 Automated video interviews involve the video capture of the word choices, 
speech patterns, and facial expressions of job applicants which is then used to 
evaluate their fit for a job position and their cultural fit within the 
organization.99 A survey of 506 companies in 2011 showed that 47% use video 
interviewing to shorten the hiring timeframe and save costs, and 22% would 
consider it for interviewing non-local candidates.100 And more recently in 2018, 
60% of organizations surveyed confirmed that they are turning to video 
interviews for recruitment.101 For example, HireVue is one such technology 
used to conduct virtual interviews, and the claim is that it can identify facial 
expressions, vocal indications, word choice, and more.102 However, “[s]peech 
recognition software can perform poorly” for certain groups of people if the 
algorithms have not been trained for those groups, and “[f]acial analysis 
systems can struggle to read the faces of women with darker skin.”103 The 
legitimacy of considering physical features and facial expressions as part of the 
hiring process is questionable given that no scientific studies have established 
any causal relationship between those attributes and workplace success.104 
 
will not lead to change. In other words, people analytics runs the risk of homosocial 
reproduction, or replacement of workers with workers that look like them, on a grand scale.” 
Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia McCormack & Jintong Tang, The Law and 
Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 961, 1013 (2017); see also Alan G. King & Marko 
J. Mrkonich, “Big Data” and the Risk of Employment Discrimination, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 555, 574 
(2016) (“[I]f incumbents are older than applicants, then the social-media profile of this older 
group may differ markedly from that of younger job applicants. Accordingly, an algorithm 
highly accurate in sorting incumbents for their proficiency may yield applicants notable only for 
their ‘retro’ tastes and lifestyles.”). 
97 BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 96, at 8. 
98 Id. at 9 (quoting Raja Parasuraman & Victor Riley, Humans and Automation: Use, Misuse, 
Disuse, Abuse, 39 HUM. FACTORS 230 (1997)). 
99 How AI Changes Recruiting Strategies Right Now, RECRUITMENT PROCESS OUTSOURCING 
ASS’N (Oct. 10, 2019), https://blog.rpoassociation.org/blog/how-ai-changes-recruiting-
strategies-right-now [https://perma.cc/2LCD-P8WF]. 
100 Heather O’Neill, Video Interviewing Cuts Costs, but Bias Worries Linger, WORKFORCE.COM 
(Oct. 5, 2011), https://www.workforce.com/news/video-interviewing-cuts-costs-but-bias-
worries-linger [https://perma.cc/GB3G-FNMQ]. 
101 Nilam Oswal, The Latest Recruitment Technology Trends and How to Really Use Them, PC 
WORLD (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/633219/latest-recruitment-
technology-trends-how-really-use-them/ [https://perma.cc/HQ8Q-ZNKW]. 
102 See BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 96, at 36. 
103 Id. at 37. 
104 See id. at 37–38. 
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 Yet, a cursory survey105 shows that a wide range of companies are already 
using automated video interviewing as part of their hiring process:   
 
1. HireVue: A pioneer in video interviewing and a platform for applicant 
management, candidate assessment and video interviewing that 
promises employer benefits of 24% cost savings and 25–40% time 
savings.106 HireVue claims that the technology captures more than a 
million meaningful data elements about a job candidate in each minute 
of video and can tell managers things about candidates’ truthfulness 
and confidence in answering questions. HireVue records candidates’ 
responses to preset questions and then analyzes and scores them based 
on tone, body language, and keyword107 and criteria that are proven to 
be predictive of job performance.108 This platform is mostly used by 
organizations in retail, customer service, and hospitality for volume 
hiring. HireVue now has more than six hundred customers and has 
delivered more than five million video interviews.109  
2. Talview: An AI-enabled video interviewing technology used by many 
Fortune 500 companies and clients across more than 102 countries.110 
Popular clients include Amazon, Cognizant, Whirlpool, and Sephora, 
among others.111 
3. Spark Hire: A popular video interviewing software with over 5000 
customers that uses on-demand video interviews to screen job 
candidates and help recruiters identify the best candidates for a job 
 
105 I also shared this survey in my written testimony to Congress. See The Future of Work: 
Protecting Workers’ Rights in the Digital Age, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on C.R. and Hum. Serv’s. of 
the H. Comm. on Educ. and Lab., 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of Ifeoma Ajunwa, then-
Assistant Professor, Cornell University Industrial and Labor Relations School), 
https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110438/witnesses/HHRG-116-ED07-
Wstate-AjunwaJDPhDI-20200205.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XXK-GX5E]. 
106 Janine Woodworth & Jake Bauer, Digital Interviewing: The Voice of the Candidate, HIREVUE 7 
(2014), http://www.thetalentboard.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Digital-Interviewing-
The-Voice-of-the-Candidate.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY2K-PJAG]. 
107 Dandan Chen, Pedro Galicia, Daniel Manjarrez, & Lauren Sims, The Growing Role of 
Technology in Talent Acquisition, ILR SCHOOL: CURRENT ISSUES AND TRENDS IN HUMAN 
RESOURCES 4 (Feb. 2018). 
108 Monika, Recruiting Software — All You Need to Know, HARVER (Aug. 23, 2019), 
https://harver.com/blog/recruiting-software/ [https://perma.cc/QCG2-3346]. 
109 Josh Bersin, AI Comes to Recruiting: Will Interviews Go the Way of the Dinosaur?, JOSH BERSIN 
(Nov. 7, 2018), https://joshbersin.com/2018/11/ai-comes-to-recruiting-will-interviews-go-
the-way-of-the-dinosaur/ [https://perma.cc/U873-WZWH]. 
110 Top 40+ Pre-Employment Assessment Tools, ACADEMY TO INVIGORATE HR (AIHR) DIGITAL 
(July 2020), https://www.digitalhrtech.com/top-pre-employment-assessment-tools/ 
[https://perma.cc/A22R-43NP]. 
111 Customers, TALVIEW, https://www.talview.com/customers [https://perma.cc/KA5U-
A448]. 
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earlier in the hiring process. Popular clients include the United States 
Postal Service, IKEA, and Volkswagen.112 
4. Wepow: This technology allows employers to pre-record or schedule 
live video interviews with candidates and compare and rank them 
based on predefined criteria. It also analyzes the recruitment process 
and highlights areas for improvement. Top customers include 
Heineken, Genentech, Virgin Atlantic, Walmart, Adidas, and many 
more.113 
 
 The use of automated interviewing is legally fraught for several reasons. 
First, algorithms have “limited ability to parse the nuanced meaning of human 
communication.” 114  Second, such checks could “surface details about an 
applicant’s race, sexual identity, disability, pregnancy, or health status, which 
employers should not consider during the hiring process.”115 And third, the 
training of such algorithms could skew the results for protected classes given 
that many software engineers are white males, and thus tend to use white male 
faces and voices as their training models.116  
 Effective January 1, 2020, the Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act 
(“AIVIA”)117 is the governing law in Illinois for any employer who chooses to 
“use artificial intelligence (AI) to analyze video interview by job candidates.”118 
Under AIVIA, employers are required to provide advance notice to the 
applicant of the use of the video interview technology, and further to  “explain 
to the applicant ‘how the [AI] works’ and what general characteristics the 
technology uses to evaluate applicants.” 119 This call for transparency is facially 
 
112 Hear It from Our Happy Customers, SPARK HIRE, https://www.sparkhire.com/customers 
[https://perma.cc/BAN5-HFWR]. 
113 Your Success Is Our Success . . . We Power You, WEPOW, 
https://www.wepow.com/en/customers [https://perma.cc/CP4L-MAA7]. 
114 BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 96, at 40 (quoting Natasha Duarte, Emma Llanso & Anna 
Loup, Mixed Messages? The Limits of Automated Social Media Content Analysis, CTR. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & TECH. 3 (Nov. 2017), https://cdt.org/files/2017/11/Mixed-Messages-
Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPU5-294N]). 
115 Id. 
116 See Kari Paul, ‘Disastrous’ Lack of Diversity in AI Industry Perpetuates Bias, Study Finds, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/16/artificial-intelligence-lack-
diversity-new-york-university-study [https://perma.cc/H2TN-4V32]. 
117 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 42 (2020). 
118 Nicole Mormilo, Matthew Jedreski, K.C. Halm & Jeffrey S. Bosley, Employers Using AI in 
Hiring Take Note: Illinois’ Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act Is Now in Effect, DAVIS WRIGHT 
TREMAINE LLP (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/artificial-intelligence-law-
advisor/2020/02/illinois-aivia-compliance [https://perma.cc/JL6E-RUQZ].  
119 Matthew Jedreski, Jeffrey S. Bosley & K.C. Halm, Illinois Becomes First State to Regulate 
Employers’ Use of Artificial Intelligence to Evaluate Video Interviews, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE 
LLP (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/artificial-intelligence-law-
advisor/2019/09/illinois-becomes-first-state-to-regulate-employers 
[https://perma.cc/46JD-2T32].  
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valuable. 120 However, many AI video analytics providers do not publish 
adequate information on the workings of their products. Thus, the effects of 
this part of the law may take one of two paths: Either AI video providers will 
be forced to publish more information about their algorithms or the standard 
for meeting this transparency mandate will be effectively so low as to become 
meaningless. Because this law is limited to Illinois, it is likely that the latter path 
be the future course.  
 Beyond transparency, the law requires that employers “obtain, in advance, 
the applicant’s consent to use the technology.” 121  The law also features 
provisions for data protection. It imposes limits on “the distribution and 
sharing of the video,” granting access “only to those persons ‘whose expertise 
or technology’ is necessary to evaluate the applicant.”122 Further, candidates 
are given some control over what happens to the video after their assessment. 
Employers are required to “destroy the video (and all backup copies) within 
30 days” of the applicant requesting its destruction.123  
 The law firm of Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP (“DWT”) identifies a few 
key issues with the law. Chiefly, the law fails to define “artificial intelligence” 
and “artificial intelligence analysis” along with other key terms. 124  This 
ambiguity may mean that certain employer AI use cases, such as “to track data 
about its candidates,” may not be covered. 125  Further, ambiguity in the 
transparency mandate of the law may, as suggested above, pose serious 
problems for its effective use. DWT notes that the law does not go in depth 
to specify “how much detail an employer must provide when ‘explaining how 
artificial intelligence works’ to an applicant” or what “‘characteristics’ of the 
AI employers must disclose.”126 Therefore, employers may be permitted to use 
broad, cursory statements such as “AI will assess a candidate’s performance” 
to satisfy this requirement, statements which do not serve the true spirit of 
transparency. DWT finds the law to be unclear in several other aspects as well. 
It notes that there is no requirement that candidates provide express written 
consent.127 Further, the law “does not include a private right of action or any 
explicit penalties,” which could raise serious issues in enforcing its 
provisions.128 As for data destruction, DWT points out that it is not clear if 
“data that an employer extracts or derives from the video interview . . . is 
subject to the destruction duty under the law.”129 If such data is not protected 
by the AIVIA, then the extent to which the act allows candidates control over 
their interview data is potentially limited. Lastly, DWT points out that “there 
is no guidance on what it means for a job to be ‘based in’ Illinois, and the 
 
120 See, Infra Section IIIB. 
121 Id.  
122 Id.  
123 Id.  
124 Id.  
125 Id.  
126 Mormilo, Jedreski, Bosley & Halm, supra note 122.  
127 See Jedreski, Bosley & Halm, supra note 123.  
128 Id. 
129 Id.  
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statute is silent as to whether employees may refuse to consider applicants who 
refuse to consent.”130 
 Ultimately, AIVIA is a step in the right direction, as it touches on the 
serious concerns of transparency and data rights. However, the primary, 
overarching issue with the law is its lack of specificity. Failing to define key 
terms, to expand on essential provisions, or to stipulate any enforcement 
mechanism means that the effective impact of the transparency and data rights 
measures is limited, and employers who wish to evade the law may do so. 
Further, while some employers may surely make a good faith effort to comply, 
many employers themselves are not privy to how the AI they use truly works. 
Companies such as HireVue keep a close guard over their algorithms and 
technologies to protect their market share, to the detriment of clients and 
candidates alike.131 In order to push AI video interview companies to be more 
transparent, the law must put in place effective penalties such that employers 
would not choose to use technology unless AI companies provided enough 
information. Effective legislation must hold enough weight to impact all 
stakeholders in the AI video interview universe. Again, it is important to 
reiterate that Illinois is “at the forefront of regulating technology and personal 
data.”132 AIVIA should be commended as first-of-its-kind legislation that is 
shedding light on critical issues of public interest.  It simply needs to go further 
to counterbalance the immense power which the AI sphere currently holds.  
 Beyond evaluation, automated hiring provides other opporutnities for 
human bias to creep in. For example, as the last step of the hiring process, 
employers make offers to applicants using automated hiring systems. The 
software programs predict the likelihood a candidate will accept a job offer, 
and what the employer can do to increase the rate of acceptance. The employer 
can “adjust salary, bonus, stock options, and other benefits to see in real time 
how the prediction changes.”133 Although these functions could be helpful for 
an effective hiring process, they might also amplify pay gaps for women and 
minority job candidates.134 Such predictive salary offers also undermine “laws 
that bar employers from considering candidates’ salary histories.”135 
 As Rachel Goodman of the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) 
writes, the flaws of automated hiring remain because of limitations in the law. 
For one, although vendors who market the hiring tools claim that these hiring 
tools are less biased than humans, the software is proprietary, and there is 
currently no way to verify these claims.136 This lack of transparency makes it 
difficult for job applicants to bring suit based on a disparate impact theory in 
“failure-to-hire” cases, as applicants are unable to identify a policy or practice 
 
130 Id.  
131 See, Infra, Section IIIB. 
132 Id.  
133 BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 96, at 41. 
134 See id. 
135 Id. 
136 Rachel Goodman, Why Amazon’s Automated Hiring Tool Discriminated Against Women, AM. 
C.L. UNION (Oct. 12, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-
rights-workplace/why-amazons-automated-hiring-tool-discriminated-against 
[https://perma.cc/UW9P-QSBJ]. 
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that led to their rejection.137 One suggestion is that “outside auditors may be 
able to uncover bias.” 138  However, such research by outside auditors is 
thwarted by various obstacles, one of them being that federal laws, such as the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, may criminalize certain types of testing of 
employment websites for discrimination.139 Given these obstacles, there are 
calls for the EEOC to expand its efforts to govern workplace algorithms.140 
Later, I will outline some federal measures that could provide true protections 
for job applicants subjected to an automated hiring regime.141 But first, I will 
parse some other solutions that I think fall short of the ultimate goal of equal 
opportunity for all job applicants.  
II. EX MACHINA: TECHNO-SOLUTIONIST APPROACHES  
 Even as legal scholars have called for more transparency 142  and 
accountability143 for machine learning algorithms, increasingly, attention has 
shifted towards technological approaches to combating algorithmic capture in 
employment. These techno-solutionist approaches generally fall into two 
categories: 1) the adjustment of human job search behavior to “game” machine 
learning algorithms and 2) the creation of new algorithms that promise to 
eliminate bias. This section notes the limitations of such approaches and      
cautions that techno-solutionist approaches will never be effective for 
problems that are, at their root, derived from socio-technical interactions 
arising from structural bias and societal prejudices.144 
A. Humans Conform to the Machine 
 One approach to counteracting the biased effects of hiring algorithms is 
to cheat the system. Thus, humans devise strategies to hurdle routine machine 




139 Id.; Sandvig v. Barr — Challenge to CFAA Prohibition on Uncovering Racial Discrimination 
Online, AM. C.L. UNION (May 22, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/cases/sandvig-v-barr-
challenge-cfaa-prohibition-uncovering-racial-discrimination-online      
[https://perma.cc/6ASQ-A2WS]. 
140 See Goodman, supra note 139. 
141 See, Infra, Section IVB. 
142 Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1269 (2020) 
(“These features . . . have prompted calls for new mechanisms of transparency and 
accountability in the age of algorithms.”); Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic 
Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 132 (2018) (“Such accountability 
requires not perfect transparency . . . but . . . meaningful transparency.”); see Danielle Keats 
Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 25 (2014) (discussing the need for oversight of algorithms); Alyssa M. Carlson, The 
Need for Transparency in the Age of Predictive Sentencing Algorithms, 103 IOWA L. REV. 303, 326 
(2017) (arguing that transparency increases accuracy); Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, 
Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473, 482 (2016) 
(discussing the lack of transparency in algorithms).                                
143 See, e.g., Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. 
Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 
636 (2017). 
144 See, e.g., Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1039 (2017). 
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recruiting manager counseled job applicants on how to avoid getting axed by 
the applicant tracking system (“ATS”).145 The article provides advice ranging 
from appropriate file format for resumes (PDFs are difficult for hiring 
algorithms to read), to the idea of choosing keywords pulled from the job 
advertisement to ensure that an unsophisticated algorithm does not reject the 
application simply because the algorithm was designed to only recognize a 
narrow list of words provided for in a keyword search.146 
 In a similar vein, there are online communities dedicated to cheating the 
personality tests that have now become ubiquitous features of automated 
hiring.147 Although some question the reliability of personality tests,148 the tests 
remain a popular part of automated hiring systems. Some experts have 
estimated that “as many as 60 percent of workers are now asked to take 
workplace assessments” and that “[t]he $500-million-a-year industry has 
grown by about 10 percent annually in recent years.” 149  While many 
organizations use personality testing for career development, about 22% use it 
to evaluate job candidates, according to the results of a 2014 survey of 344 
Society for Human Resource Management members.150 While some lawsuits 
have sought to eliminate the tests, most workers have resigned themselves to 
encountering the test as part of the hiring process and have come to rely on 
online “answer keys” created to beat the tests. 151  These “answer keys,” 
however, represent conformity to the unfair practices of automated hiring, 
rather than a true protest of their potential to discriminate in insidious ways. 
That is, efforts to cheat or beat the system merely represent the acquiescence 
of humans to a regime of algorithmically derived worker selection that is 
fundamentally unfair to protected categories of workers.152  
B. Algorithms to the Rescue 
 Another technological approach is the development of new algorithmic 
hiring tools that purport to eliminate biases. A recent swell of start-ups153 are 
 




147 See Melanie Shebel, Unicru Personality Test Answer Key: Read This and Get Hired, TOUGH 
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http://www.timothyhorrigan.com/documents/unicru-personality-test.answer-key.html 
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148 See, e.g., Gill Plimmer, How to Cheat a Psychometric Test, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2014),      
https://www.ft.com/content/eeda84e4-b4f6-11e3-9166-00144feabdc0 
[https://perma.cc/LDH9-7Z6Z]. 
149 Dori Meinert, What Do Personality Tests Really Reveal?, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 
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hawking new ways to automate hiring. Some of these companies also claim 
that their technological approaches ensure employment decisions that are non-
discriminatory. 154  Although these start-ups may very well have the good 
intention of eliminating human bias in hiring, I argue that the lack of any 
established internal or external auditing protocols means that those good 
intentions cannot be verified in practice, and I remain steadfast in my belief 
that any solely techno-solutionist attempts at a solution without legal oversight 
will fall short. 
 Legal scholars have called for greater transparency for hiring algorithms,155 
with the belief that “greater disclosure of how [algorithms] operate” will help 
avoid unfairness.156 Professor Frank Pasquale suggests that a solution to the 
problem of algorithmic discrimination is transparency; he uses the metaphor 
of the “black box” and proposes that algorithms should not operate as black 
boxes but should be opened up for examination.157 However, some argue that 
this call for transparency is not sufficient for algorithms to be completely fair 
in regard to legal standards.158 This is because transparency alone does not fully 
explain why a particular decision was made or how fairly the system operates.159 
Rather, those scholars argue that governing algorithms requires design 
principles that provide checks for bias. Professor Joshua A. Kroll and his co-
authors suggest technical strategies that would help overcome hidden biases in 
the algorithms. 160  For instance, they suggest incorporating randomness to 
maximize the gain of learning from experience; if the hiring algorithms are 
random such that they hire some candidates who are not predicted to do well, 
“the validity of the initial assumptions can be tested and the accuracy and 
fairness of the whole system will benefit over time.”161 
 Professors Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst join this debate to note that 
the inscrutability and the nonintuitive nature of machine learning algorithms 
are both factors in automated decision-making. They define “inscrutability” as 
“a situation in which the rules that govern decision-making are so complex, 
 
154 Aarti Shahani, Now Algorithms Are Deciding Whom to Hire, Based on Voice, NPR: ALL TECH 
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numerous, and interdependent that they defy practical inspection and resist 
comprehension.”162It is true that inscrutability can become a problem when 
you have machine learning algorithms that are creating de novo rules on their 
own. But the authors note  that the human need to understand the intuitive 
relationship between any given automated decision and the underlying data is 
“not the demand for disclosure or accessible explanations; it is a demand that 
decision-making rely on reasoning that comports with intuitive understanding 
of the phenomenon in question,”163 I argue that this human need for “intuitive 
understanding” is a desire for justice, rather than a quest for technical redress. 
There is both a human need to understand the factors under which one is 
judged (especially for access to livelihood) and a desire to see factors done 
away with that do not conform to principles of fairness. 
C. The Perils of Techno-Solutionism 
 In the specific case of automated hiring systems, techno-solutionist 
methods fail to address the bias encoded in the business practices deployed in 
the hiring process. In fact, those methods may even serve to replicate the 
shortcomings of human decision-making processes in hiring. For example, 
although the websites providing “answer keys” to beat employment 
personality tests may help a handful of people who would otherwise have been 
rejected, they also ultimately serve to reify the personality tests as part of the 
job application process and to calcify the same practice as part of business 
procedure for employers to screen applicants. In effect, such resistance efforts 
may be futile attempts to combat “algorithmic governmentality,” which as one 
scholar has argued “anticipates our every move, mapping out in advance an 
apolitical ideal of behaviour and performance . . . to which the subject must 
adapt and conform without reflection.”164 This suggests a need for remedies 
that do not unquestioningly privilege technological innovation, but which 
uphold the goals of antidiscrimination laws through careful legal oversight. As 
other scholars have noted, techno-solutionist approaches to societal problems 
are foiled by the “bias in, bias out” problem.165 That is, techno-solutionist 
approaches that fail to take into account structural biases encoded in the 
algorithm or which fail to question the provenance of training data and how 
they might bear the taint of historical inequities are doomed to replicate the 
same biased results. 
 
 
162 Selbst & Barocas, supra note 161, at 1094.      
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III.  DO EMPLOYMENT LAWS ADEQUATELY ADDRESS AUTOMATED 
HIRING? 
 
 In this section, I discuss the limitations of employment law in protecting 
job applicants who experience an adverse impact from automated hiring 
systems. I review employment law scholarship that offers empirical evidence 
of the difficulty of proving employment discrimination based on a disparate 
impact cause of action and the theories proffered by legal scholars as to why 
this might be the case. Given that the means of proving discrimination by 
automated hiring systems remains solely under the control of employers, I 
argue that there is a necessity for compulsory data retention by employers 
making use of automated hiring systems and that furthermore such data 
retention should facilitate both mandated and voluntary audits.166 Finally, I 
note the potential for trade secret law to be used as a shield against such audits, 
and I argue that audits by an independent auditing body would serve to allay 
any fears as to the misuse of proprietary information. These measures will aid 
in data retention to help compile the statistical proof required by disparate 
impact claimants, and an independent external auditing mandate would help 
to maintain the intellectual property law shield for proprietary automated 
systems. They will also level the field for disparate impact claimants and 
eliminate the current Sisyphean climb to proving discrimination on the basis 
of disparate impact. 
 
A. The Uphill Climb for Disparate Impact Claims 
 As several legal scholars have demonstrated through empirical data, 
plaintiffs aiming to bring an employment discrimination claim on a theory of 
disparate impact, rather than disparate treatment, face an uphill battle. 167 
Professor Michael Selmi assesses the disparate impact theory’s legacy.168 Based 
on an extensive empirical analysis of court cases, his article employs detailed 
statistics to demonstrate the difficulty of proving disparate impact cases.169 The 
disparate impact theory initially arose to deal with specific practices, such as 
seniority systems and written tests, that were perpetuating intentional 
discrimination.170 Even though courts have not restricted the theory to those 
particular contexts, it has “proved an ill fit for any challenge other than to 
written examinations.”171 
 Selmi finds that the Supreme Court “had rejected more challenges than it 
had accepted, and it had largely limited the theory to its origins — namely 
testing claims and perhaps some other objective procedures capable of formal 
 
166 See infra Part IV.  
167 See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & 
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validation,” by the end of the first decade of disparate impact theory.172 The 
following two decades further confirmed the theory’s limited reach.173 This 
limited reach is “particularly significant,” considering that employment 
discrimination claims in general are already “notoriously difficult to prove.”174 
Selmi notes that “if intentional discrimination is difficult to prove with existing 
circumstantial evidence,” it will be even more difficult for society to accept 
unintended negatives effects as racism.” 175  Based on the belief that the 
disparate impact theory was a mistake, Selmi suggests that a broader judicial 
definition of intent would have “opened our eyes to the persistence of 
discrimination in a way that the disparate impact theory could not.”176 
 Similarly, Professor Sandra Sperino provides exhaustive case law evidence 
of a defendant-friendly bias to the adjudication of disparate impact cases and 
discusses the development of disparate impact law. 177  For example, the 
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. recognized the disparate impact 
theory of employment discrimination under Title VII by indicating that “good 
intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment 
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for 
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”178 Later, in 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the Court “tipp[ed] the scales in favor of 
employers” by “placing the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff and by 
requiring the employer only to articulate a legitimate reason for its conduct.”179 
Moreover in Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court, while recognizing that 
disparate impact is a viable claim under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 180  “affirmed the dismissal of the 
petitioners’ claims, finding that they had not produced enough evidence to 
prevail on a disparate impact claim.”181 According to Justice O’Connor, the 
Court in Wards Cove signaled a defendant-friendly analysis by first requiring the 
plaintiff to establish that the application of a particular employment practice 
created a disparate impact, then requiring the employer to produce evidence 
that “its action was based on a reasonable nonage factor,” and lastly mandating 
the plaintiff to bear the burden of disproving the company’s assertion.182 
 Sperino notes that, in reality, disparate impact claims appear to have been 
disfavored even before the Smith case.183 Litigants arguing a disparate impact 
case “face significant initial costs that are either absent or are less significant in 
a disparate treatment case”; “the reliance on statistical evidence requires 
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177 Sandra F. Sperino, Disparate Impact or Negative Impact?: The Future of Non-Intentional 
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178 Id. at 348 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).           
179 Id. at 349 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 673 (1989) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting)).      
180 Id. at 354 (citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 228 (2005)). 
181 Id. (quoting Smith, 544 U.S. at 242). 
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plaintiffs to obtain large amounts of data from the defendant and other 
sources.”184 Furthermore, the necessary evidence required by the plaintiff “is 
largely in the hands of the defendant and must be sought through the discovery 
process.”185 Because defendants are often reluctant to produce the information 
voluntarily, the process of collecting and analyzing statistical evidence is “both 
complex and arduous.”186 
 Both Selmi’s and Sperino’s research offers grist for a re-imagining of 
redress mechanisms for employment discrimination. First, I concur with 
Selmi’s conclusions here regarding the need for a more expansive definition of 
intent in proving employment discrimination cases. This is why, in another 
article, I have proposed a new theory of action, discrimination per se, which takes 
into account the particular difficulties of proof presented when a plaintiff is 
seeking to challenge an employer’s use of an automated hiring system for 
employment discrimination.187 Discrimination per se would effectively operate as 
a third cause of action under Title VII.188 Per my proposal,      
 
a plaintiff can assert that a hiring practice (for example, the use of 
proxy variables in automated hiring resulting in or with the potential to 
result in adverse impact to protected categories) is so egregious as to 
amount to discrimination per se, and this would shift the burden of proof 
from the plaintiff to the defendant (employer) to show that its practice 
is non-discriminatory.189 
 
This burden-shifting eliminates the uphill climb confronting disparate impact 
claimants during which they must procure sufficient statistical evidence of 
disproportionate impact.  
 However, even with the proposed theory of discrimination per se as help for 
the plaintiff, Sperino’s point that plaintiffs of employment discrimination cases 
are disadvantaged by the necessary reliance on the employer to provide the 
very data they need to prove their case still stands. A major thread that runs 
through the dismissed cases on automated hiring is the court’s finding of a lack 
of evidence or the inability of the plaintiff to provide proof of their allegations 
of discrimination.  
 Consider the case of Gladden v. Bolden.190 Warren Gladden, an African 
American male, filed suit against NASA alleging race and age discrimination in 
violation of Title VII and ADEA.191 He argued that the automated hiring 
 
184 Id. at 360. 
185 Id. at 360–61. 
186 Id. at 361 (quoting Hill v. Miss. State Emp’t Serv., 918 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1990)  
187 See Ajunwa, supra note 6, at 1727–28. 
188 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects the job applicant against discrimination 
on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, and religion. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-
17. Plaintiffs must establish that “a respondent uses a particular employment practice that 
causes a disparate impact on the basis of [a protected characteristic] and the respondent fails 
to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and 
consistent with its business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
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system used by NASA, Resumix, had a selection process that was 
discriminatory as his resume was not moved forward in the hiring process even 
though he claimed he had “extensive” experience.192 However, NASA testified 
that the Resumix system did not take race, gender, or age into account when 
it was analyzing and scoring resumes.193 The court thus dismissed the plaintiff’s 
complaint, citing a lack of evidence.194 
 In yet another case, Vazirabadi v. Denver Health,195  the plaintiff Alireza 
Vazirabadi brought suit against Denver Health alleging discrimination on the 
basis of age and national origin. Vazirabadi alleged that he had selected “yes” 
for a voluntary question on the online application which asked if he was more 
than forty years old.196 Also, another question on the online application form 
asked about foreign language skills, and he had indicated that he was fluent in 
Farsi. 197  Vazirabadi submitted a charge of discrimination with the EEOC           
when he was not hired and the company hired a 34-year-old Caucasian and a 
28-year-old Hispanic, for the two positions he had applied for.198 The court 
found, however, that Vazirabadi had not provided sufficient evidence to 
support his claim, and that his allegations were based “solely on conjecture.”199 
Thus, the court approved the hospital’s motion for summary judgment and 
dismissed the case.200 
 The difficulties of proof for applicants regarding discrimination via 
automated hiring systems are further exacerbated by intellectual property law 
and the CFAA.  
 
B. Intellectual Property Law and the CFAA 
 
 Any attempt by plaintiffs to access proof of discrimination in automated 
hiring systems may be stymied by extant laws, such as intellectual property law 
and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), both of which have been 
invoked by the makers of automated decision-making systems as shields to 
scrutiny. 201  Corporations, claiming trade secret, have invoked intellectual 
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property law to prevent the disclosure of information related to their 
proprietary algorithms. 202  Similarly, the CFAA has been read to protect 
automated systems from outside audits with the argument that such audits 
violate the terms of service for the systems. 203  Although the ACLU has 
brought suit on behalf of several academic researchers aiming to audit such 
systems and has alleged that the CFAA is unconstitutionally overbroad,204 
there has yet to be a proposed solution to the argument that trade secret laws 
may also serve as an impediment to the auditing of decision-making 
algorithms.205 
 Similarly, Professors Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale discuss the 
concerns about the disparate impact of machine learning algorithms and the 
attendant calls for transparency. 206  They claim that the argument against 
opacity as “right to an explanation” under the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”) is ineffective and blocks the ability for recourse.207 The 
authors suggest that “subject-centric” explanations, regional based focus on 
models, as   explanation systems, can not only reveal more but could also 
circumvent any developer’s intellectual property or trade secret concerns.208  
 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/how-computers-are-harming-
criminal-justice.html [https://perma.cc/BMW4-XPQ6]; Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence 
of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 19, 43 (2017) (discussing how 
trade secret law can protect policing algorithms from scrutiny); Sonia Katyal, supra note 4, at 
117 (discussing the same and suggesting a whistleblowing framework to enable disclosure of 
biased algorithms). 
202 For example, Nicole Wong, in her role as Google’s Associate General Counsel, has stated 
that “Google avidly protects every aspect of its search technology from disclosure.” Nicole 
Wong, Response to the DoJ Motion, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Feb. 17, 2006),      
https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/02/response-to-doj-motion.html 
[https://perma.cc/SC5K-72T8]. 
203 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). Circuits have interpreted the CFAA in divergent ways. Compare 
Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. Carmicle, 846 F.3d 1167, 1174–75 (11th Cir. 2017), and United 
States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010), and Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 
F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006), and EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 
577, 582–84 (1st Cir. 2001) (adopting a broad interpretation of “exceed[ing] authorized 
access”), with United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 528 (2d Cir. 2015), and United States v. 
Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2012), and WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 
687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a broader interpretation). And despite its holding 
in Nosal rejecting a broad interpretation of the CFAA, the Ninth Circuit recently held that 
continuing to access a website after receiving a cease-and-desist letter created liability under 
the CFAA. Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(“But when Facebook sent the cease and desist letter, Power, as it conceded, knew that it no 
longer had permission to access Facebook’s computers at all. Power, therefore, knowingly 
accessed and without permission took, copied, and made use of Facebook’s data.”). The 
Supreme Court recently denied Power Ventures’ petition for certiorari, Power Ventures, Inc. 
v. Facebook, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017) (mem.); Power Ventures would have provided the 
Court with its first opportunity to bridge the gulf between broad and narrow interpretations 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
204 See Complaint at 4, Sandvig v. Lynch, No. 16-cv-01368 (D.D.C. June 29, 2016). 
205 Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets, supra note 204, at 1429. 
206 Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm: Why a Right to an Explanation Is 
Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 19–22 (2017). 
207 Id. at 44. 
208 Id. at 56–57. 
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 I argue then, that as a pragmatic matter, while it may take time to carve out 
exceptions to intellectual property law and the CFAA framework, 209  an 
independent third-party auditor, that pledges to keep secret any trade secret 
information it obtains in the auditing process, and which is buoyed by the labor 
market preferences of job applicants, may afford a more immediate approach 
to addressing the issues of transparency and accountability for automated 
hiring systems. I discuss this in detail below in Section IV.B. 
 
C. Recognizing an Affirmative Duty  
I argue here that any affirmative duty of care imposed on an employer 
should carry also an auditing imperative for automated hiring systems. But first: 
Is there an affirmative duty of care for employers? From what legal basis is this 
duty of care derived? 
Over the last several decades, legal scholars have begun calling for the 
application of tort law to the framework through which we understand 
employment discrimination. Professor David Benjamin Oppenheimer first 
noted that the Supreme Court’s primary theories of employment 
discrimination could readily be analogized to intentional tort and strict liability 
doctrines.210   Then, Oppenheimer elaborates on this analogy, arguing that 
employment discrimination can most aptly be compared to the tort doctrine 
of negligence.211   
First, Oppenheimer argues that the theory of unconscious racism must 
be applied to employment discrimination. 212  Through this theory, 
Oppenheimer explains that racist acts are often the product of unconscious 
bias and stereotyping — not conscious decisions.213  As such, humans may not 
even be aware that they are making such judgments, while their actions still 
reflect their unconscious perceptions.214 Effectively, this opens the door for 
people to have unconscious biases that impact others in a negative way.215   
Oppenheimer then parallels this notion to the idea of employment 
discrimination, arguing that employers may not consciously hold racist or 
 
209 Note that one scholar advocates for exceptions to copyright law that would allow for 
scrutiny of decision-making algorithms by third parties without violating the CFAA and also 
allow for otherwise copyrighted material to be used as part of the training data for 
algorithmic systems. Amanda Levendowki, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s 
Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 594–96 (2018). My approach focuses on the idea 
of a certified third-party auditor that would alleviate the concerns regarding proprietary 
information, and does not necessarily require a change in existing framework — a fraught 
and contentious process. See infra Section IV.  
210 See NEGLIGENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 28, at 899. 
211 Id.   
212 Id. at 900–01.   
213 Id.  In fact, a person’s attempt to understand his or her relationship to the world often 
necessarily means the person must categorize other individuals and draw comparisons 
between himself or herself and others.213 People learn this skill from a very young age, such 
that making snap judgments about others becomes part of the way their brains work Id. At 
901-902 
214 Id.      
215 See id.  
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discriminatory views, but nonetheless discriminate in their conduct towards 
employees. 216  He observes a swift upward trend towards most white 
Americans professing a commitment to nondiscrimination in employment.217  
Yet, Title VII and other statutory prohibitions of race discrimination are still 
necessary because racism is often an unconscious bias. 218  Furthermore, 
supporting the principle of nondiscrimination in employment does not 
necessarily mean that all white Americans are also in support of federal 
enforcement of employment discrimination laws. 219  In fact, based on one 
study, Oppenheimer suggests that 97% of the support for nondiscrimination 
is an “empty gesture,” meaning white Americans often do not back up the 
“support” they suggest in surveys.220 Similarly, while many white Americans 
had attested that they were committed to nondiscrimination, they were 
similarly more likely to describe African Americans as being more “lazy” and 
less “honest” than other Americans. 221  Using these studies, Oppenheimer 
concludes that white Americans are frequently unaware of their own internal 
racism.222   
Oppenheimer then argues that a theory of employment discrimination 
that focuses on intent to discriminate can provide no remedy for most 
discrimination, because there often is no intent involved. 223  The intent 
requirement is ultimately based on a false binary — “[w]hen Congress enacted 
Title VII it provided little guidance on the standard that courts should require 
for proof of discrimination.”224 The Supreme Court supplemented this by 
dividing discrimination cases into claims that looked like intentional torts, and 
others that looked more like strict liability.225   
With this in mind, Oppenheimer provides an analysis of Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., a case applying the strict liability employment law theory.226 Here, 
the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the “consequences of 
employment practices, not simply the motivation.”227 As such, it found that 
the employer was strictly liable for its unintended but harmful conduct, 
without using the words “strict liability.”228  
 
216 Id.  
217 Id. at 903.   
218 See id.   
219 See id. at 905.   
220 Id.   
221 Id. at 910.   
222 Id. at 916.   
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 919.   
225 Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (explaining that where 
an employee challenges a specific employment decision, she must prove it was motivated by 
an intent to discriminate); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (explaining that 
where an employee challenges policies or procedures that have a discriminatory effect, she 
may rely on strict liability theory rather than having to prove intentional discrimination)).  
226 Id. at 920 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S.).  
227 See NEGLIGENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 28, at 921 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).  
228 See id.  
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Next, Oppenheimer delves into the idea of the intentional tort, which 
presented itself in the McDonnell Douglas case.229 In this case, the Supreme 
Court held that in an individual discrimination case, the plaintiff must prove 
an intent to discriminate by showing, for example, that “she was qualified for 
an open job which remained open after her rejection.”230 After this point, 
employers can defend themselves by showing that there was a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for their decisions.231  
 Yet the Supreme Court began to articulate a third approach to the adverse 
impact and strict liability doctrines — the less discriminatory alternative 
doctrine.232 In these cases, a plaintiff could prevail if she could show that 
“other selection devices without a similar discriminatory effect would also 
serve the employer’s legitimate interest.”233 Oppenheimer argues that this test 
opened the door for the application of the doctrine of negligence to 
employment discrimination case.234 He explains that “[n]egligence, at its core, 
is the breach of a duty recognized by law for the protection of others.”235 
Employers often have this duty — for example, the duty to provide a safe 
workplace or to protect employees from unfit co-employees or supervisors.236 
Then, he argues that the employment relationship is a “special relationship,” 
such that both employees and employers enter into the employment 
relationship with care and owe each other certain duties.237 Here, employers 
could be responsible for not protecting employees from discriminatory 
practices.238 
 The article also compares this duty to the duty to accommodate differences, 
found in Teamsters, where the Court discussed the liability of failing to act.239 
Though this has largely been used in the context of religious accommodations, 
any employer who failed to prevent discrimination from occurring could 
ostensibly be held liable. 240  In fact, after years of unsuccessful sexual 
harassment claims, the EEOC began applying the liability for failure to act — 
for example, in the case of workplace sexual harassment, an employer may be 
responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to “sexual 
harassment . . . in the workplace, where the employer . . . knows or should 
have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate 
 
229 See id. at 922. 
230 See id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).  
231 See id. at 922–23 (citing McDonnell Douglass, 411 U.S. at 802). 
232 See id. at 931. 
233 See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1015 (2d Cir. 1980).  
234 See NEGLIGENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 28, at 932.  
235 Id.  
236 Id. (citing Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (safe 
workplace); Najera v. S. Pac. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (unfit co-
employees and supervisors)). 
237 Id. at 932–33 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314B (1965)). 
238 See id. at 933.  
239 See id. at 936.  
240 See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d, 402 U.S. 689 
(1971) (per curiam) (testing the duty to accommodate religious beliefs). Other employment 
contexts in which this idea has been applied are the duty to accommodate pregnancy and the 
duty to accommodate disabilities.  
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corrective action.”241 Through an evolving landscape of the law, Oppenheimer 
demonstrates that negligent discrimination is potentially closer to practice than 
we think.  
 Oppenheimer’s ideas opened the door for other legal scholars to explore 
the application of tort law to employment discrimination, as well as the 
possibility of a duty for employers to prevent discrimination. One example of 
such exploration is a 2009 article by Professor Noah D. Zatz, which 
confronted the idea that employers have a duty to do more than simply 
respond when employees are harassed or discriminated against by outsiders.242 
To begin, Zatz explains the case of Dunn v. Washington County Hospital, in which 
an employee sued her employer for sex discrimination after she made a 
complaint to the hospital that an independent contractor at the hospital — 
therefore, a third party — was sexually harassing her and the hospital did not 
act.243 Here, the Seventh Circuit stated that “[t]he employer’s responsibility is 
to provide its employees with nondiscriminatory working conditions. The 
genesis of inequality matters not; what does matter is how the employer handles 
the problem.”244 This notion seems to expand far beyond that of an employer’s 
duty to maintain a non-discriminatory environment, extending even to actors 
outside of the employer’s direct control.245 
Interestingly, Zatz’s theory also rejects some long-held beliefs about 
Title VII — notably that there has to be either disparate treatment or disparate 
impact in order to prove discrimination, an idea which Oppenheimer had also 
rejected in his analysis of Griggs and McDonnell Douglas.246 In fact, by analyzing 
the treatment of third parties in discrimination cases, Zatz suggests that there 
is, and should be, an entirely separate doctrine for cases of non-
accommodation, where the employer refuses to reasonably accommodate 
employee’s complaints of discrimination.247 To make this point, Zatz argues 
that by providing reasonable accommodations and refraining from disparate 
treatment, employers can prevent “membership causation,” a phrase used to 
describe when an employee suffers workplace harm due to her membership in 
a protected class, regardless of where that harm comes from.248 Then, because 
the employer is capable of preventing membership causation, Zatz explains 
that the employer should be liable for workplace harm when it does occur.249 
Though Zatz focuses primarily on the application of this doctrine to third 
parties, his message is clear — employers have a duty to prevent discrimination 
in the workplace, and should be held liable when they fail to do so. 
In addition to Professors Oppenheimer and Zatz, Professor Charles 
Sullivan similarly finds a corollary between tort law and employment law 
 
241 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2020); see also NEGLIGENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 28, at 
956. 
242 MANAGING THE MACAW, supra note 29, at 1359.   
243 Id. at 1359 (citing Dunn v. Wash. Cnty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2005)).  
244 Id. (quoting Dunn, 429 F.3d at 691).  
245 See id. at 1360.  
246 See NEGLIGENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 28, at 919.  
247 See MANAGING THE MACAW, supra note 29, at 1362.  
248 See id.  
249 See id. at 1364.  
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regarding the question of imposed duties for employers. In his 2012 article, 
Sullivan focuses primarily on the idea of discrimination as an intentional tort.250 
The article primarily details one case, Staub v. Proctor Hospital, in which the 
Supreme Court further wrote tort law into antidiscrimination statutes by 
explicitly adopting tort law’s definition of intent for statutory discrimination 
cases.251 However, instead of easing the notion of discriminatory intent like 
many perceived Staub to do, Sullivan argues that Staub actually adds another 
layer to the plaintiff’s burden.252 
The plaintiff in Staub was fired by his employer because of his service 
in the military, 253  which was unlawful under the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act.254 Sullivan notes that Staub will 
govern cases under more traditional antidiscrimination statutes, including Title 
VII, as they provide similar language for antidiscrimination claims.255 Both 
statutes place the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff, and will not allow 
damages if the employer meets its burden of showing that it would have made 
the same decision regardless of the protected characteristic.256   
Analyzing the employment discrimination claim, Justice Scalia held 
that if a supervisor performed an act motivated by discriminatory animus that 
was “intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if 
that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the 
employer is liable . . . .”257 As Sullivan notes, this is the first time the language 
of tortious intent had been brought directly into the employment law 
context.258 Sullivan argues that this case left open many questions as to what 
the employer’s actual duties are.259 For example, where Zatz had argued for 
liability arising from third parties, Sullivan notes that under this intent-based 
analysis, it is unclear whether an employer could even be liable for the actions 
of subordinates.260 Sullivan’s analysis raises the question of how far tort law 
can truly be integrated into employment discrimination law, at least without 
also requiring a duty to prevent discrimination.  
Professor Richard Thompson Ford similarly mulled over the question 
of intent as part of employment discrimination. Ford argues precisely for how 
to fill the gap that Oppenheimer had described — “abandon[ing] conceptual 
disputes over ‘discrimination’ in favor of [discussing] the employer’s 
affirmative duty to avoid decisions and policies that [harm] underrepresented 
 
250 Charles Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1431 (2012) 
(hereinafter Tortifying Employment Discrimination).  
251 See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2009).  
252 TORTIFYING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 258, at 1431–32.  
253 See Staub, 562 U.S. at 411. 
254 See TORTIFYING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 258, at 1435 (citing Pub. L. 
No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3153 (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–35 (2006))).  
255 See id. at 1435–36 (citing Staub, 562 U.S. at 417) (clarifying that both statues “declare it is 
unlawful for the specified grounds to be a ‘motivating factor’ for the challenged employment 
action,” among other similar language).  
256 See id. at 1436.  
257 Id. at 1439–40 (quoting Staub, 562 U.S. at 422).  
258 See id. at 1433.  
259 See id. at 1448.  
260 See id.  
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or stigmatized groups.”261 Ford begins his argument with the notion of civil 
rights as the idea that we should protect individuals from potentially oppressive 
states. 262  Over time, he explains, the law has gradually grown to protect 
individuals not just from oppressive states but also oppressive private 
institutions.263 By assigning rights to overcome these private actors, he argues 
that having legal rights does not mean that an individual is specially protected 
against power.264 Instead, these rights are a political decision to assign power 
from one group to another.265 This is the notion that drove change throughout 
the civil rights era of the American 1960s.266  
Today, one of these rights is the right not to be discriminated against 
in employment based on certain prohibited reasons, including race, sex, 
religion, etc.267 Yet, while the law states that employers must not discriminate 
on certain enumerated bases, Ford observes that the law also creates a duty of 
care, though this duty has been largely undefined.268 Lacking a definition, the 
bounds of an employer’s duty of care have been debated. Traditionally, the 
idea has been that employers would only be liable for discrimination that they 
can prevent as institutions but could not be liable for the discrimination 
they — the entities themselves — did not cause.269 This means that employers 
are simply encouraged to avoid decisions that undermine social equality, but 
are not actually encouraged to promote social equality.270 
However, even when employers have reasonable anti-harassment or 
antidiscrimination policies, employees still may face harassment or 
discrimination. 271  That injustice is no different for the individual simply 
because the employer has an antidiscrimination policy.272 As such, Ford argues 
that the law should address the outcomes openly by defining the employer’s 
duty of care.273 For example, he suggests a policy change that would reward 
employers who hire members of underrepresented groups, instead of making 
it more “risky” to hire such people for desire to protect the company from 
liability.274 Similarly, a manager who discriminates in the workplace, where the 
employer has a reasonable antidiscrimination policy, has acted outside the 
scope of his authority and should be liable for that action independently.275 In 
effect, Ford argues for a complete overhaul of the system of antidiscrimination 
 
261 RETHINKING RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 2942. 
262 See id. at 2946.  
263 See id. (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946) (applying constitutional 
standards to private entities that serve a “public function”); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948) (extending constitutional rights to private action)).  
264 See id.  
265 See id.  
266 See id. at 2949.  
267 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). 
268 See RETHINKING RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 2950–51.  
269 See id. at 2956.  
270 See BIAS IN THE AIR, supra note 25, at 1388.  
271 See RETHINKING RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 2957.  
272 See id. at 2957–58.  
273 See id. at 2959. 
274 See id. at 2960. 
275 See BIAS IN THE AIR, supra note 25, at 1417.  
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law in favor of policy that hits at the source of the outcomes that employment 
law actively tries to prevent.   
Following in the footsteps of these legal scholars, I argue that in the 
age of automated decision-making that we now live in, an auditing imperative 
assigned to the use of automated hiring system is one way to delineate the 
employer’s affirmative duty of care. This auditing imperative demands certain 
actions on the part of the employers as well as the designers of automated 
hiring systems. Below, I detail a hybrid approach to the redress of employment 
discrimination that, although not doing away entirely with the intent 
requirement, focuses on alternative means to prevent employment 
discrimination, by requiring external and internal audits, mandating design 
elements that allow for record keeping and data retention as the standard mode 
for automated hiring, and allowing for collective bargaining by workers to set 
the terms of use of automated hiring in the workplace.  
 
 
IV. A HYBRID APPROACH 
As described above, the problems with automated hiring go beyond the 
scope of issues that could typically be addressed through litigation. Thus, any 
attempts to remedy those problems must necessarily adopt a hybrid approach. 
I set forth two proposed hybrid measures: 1) Mandated audits (both external 
and internal, which will enable litigation) and 2) Collective bargaining, which 
could serve three ends: encouraging fairness by design for automated hiring 
systems by pushing for embedded data-retention mechanisms; including 
probative criteria in hiring to ensure that criteria is not merely a stand-in for 
class membership; and negotiating for data control and checks on data 
portability to prevent the algorithmic blackballing of employees. I also address 
some potential objections to these proposed measures. 
 The auditing of automated decision-making systems is an idea that is 
gaining ground.276 This is especially true with regard to employment decision-
 
276 See AUDITING ALGORITHMS, supra note 21, at 191 (proposing the retention of audits of 
automated decision-making to check for discrimination); Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State 
in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369, 372–73 (2016) (“[P]olicymakers 
must devise ways of enabling regulators to evaluate algorithmically-embedded controls . . .”); 
Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 16–17 (2017) (discussing designing algorithmic systems to enable 
audits by regulators); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 144, at 24–25 (proposing that the FTC 
audit consumer scoring systems); Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need 
for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 169–71 (2010) 
(calling for monitoring of search engines and considering the possibility of the FTC playing 
that role); W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 464-
65 (2017) (calling for greater FDA and third-party scrutiny of medical algorithms); Paul 
Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the American Legal Response 
to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1325 (1992) (calling for “independent governmental 
monitoring of data processing systems”); Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for 
Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1312–16 (2015) (proposing that the FTC 
monitor Amazon); Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Sean K. Hallisey, Equality and Privacy by Design: 
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making, as several experts working in the field support the idea of mandated 
audits for automated hiring systems. One quibble is whether such audits 
should be internal or external. Meredith Whittaker, co-founder of the AI Now 
Institute at New York University and founder of Google’s Open Research 
group, notes that “AI is not impartial or neutral” and suggests that “in the case 
of systems meant to automate candidate search and hiring, we need to ask 
ourselves: What assumptions about worth, ability and potential do these 
systems reflect and reproduce? Who was at the table when these assumptions 
were encoded?”277 She also observes that because “systems like HireVue are 
proprietary and not open to review,” there is no way to “validate their claims 
of fairness and ensure they aren’t simply tech-washing and amplifying 
longstanding patterns of discrimination[.]”278 Thus, she insists on the need for 
audits by experts, advocacy groups, and academia.279 
 In response to this concern, Loren Larsen, Chief Technology Officer of 
HireVue, admits that it is very important to audit the algorithms used in hiring 
to identify and correct for any bias but argues that “[n]o company doing this 
kind of work should depend only on a third-party firm to ensure that they are 
doing this work in a responsible way . . . . [I]t is the responsibility of the 
company itself to audit the algorithms as an ongoing, day-to-day process.”280 
  
 
A. Internal Auditing as Corporate Social Responsibility 
 A federal regime of mandated internal auditing will ensure that companies 
diligently review the outcomes of automated hiring and correct for any 
discovered bias. On August 19, 2019, a group of 181 business executives 
collaboratively working together as the Business Roundtable released a 
statement in which they recognized a responsibility beyond merely satisfying 
shareholders. 281 Rather, the group, which included executives from Walmart, 
 
A New Model of Artificial Intelligence Data Transparency Via Auditing, Certification, and Safe Harbor 
Regimes, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 428, 429 (2019) (proposing “an auditing regime and a 
certification program, run either by a governmental body or, in the absence of such entity, by 
private institutions”); see also Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward 
a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 121–24 (2014) (considering 
auditing by public agencies to address predictive privacy). 
277 Eric Rosenbaum, Silicon Valley Is Stumped: Even A.I. Cannot Always Remove Bias from Hiring, 
CNBC (May 30, 2018, 5:54 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/30/silicon-valley-is-
stumped-even-a-i-cannot-remove-bias-from-hiring.html [https://perma.cc/L3TY-TAK9]. 
278 See id. 
279 See id. 
280 Id. 
281 The statement begins: “Americans deserve an economy that allows each person to 
succeed through hard work and creativity and to lead a life of meaning and dignity. We 
believe the free-market system is the best means of generating good jobs, a strong and 
sustainable economy, innovation, a healthy environment and economic opportunity for all.” 
Statement from Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. 
ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-
redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans 
[https://perma.cc/Q5PD-RYAY]. 
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Apple, Pepsi, and others, acknowledged that they must also “invest in their 
employees, protect the environment and deal fairly and ethically with their 
suppliers.” 282  Given this acknowledgement, I argue that internal audits to 
check automated hiring systems for bias are a key part of the corporate social 
responsibility (“CSR”) of business firms.  
 Thus, I propose that large corporations and other entities should be 
required to implement a business system of regular self-audits of their hiring 
outcomes to check for disparate impact. Such mandated self-audits would be 
similar to the mandated self-audits of financial institutions. In an internal audit 
activity, self-auditing, or self-assessment, a “department, division, team of 
consultants, or other practitioner(s) [provide] independent, objective assurance 
and consulting services designed to add value and improve an organization’s 
operations.”283 By evaluating and improving the effectiveness of “governance, 
risk management and control processes” in a systematic and disciplined way, 
internal auditing helps an organization reach its objectives.284 
 I note here that legislation similar to the audit regime I am proposing has 
been introduced by several members of the New York City Council. The 
proposed legislation, filed on February 27, 2020, would make it unlawful to 
sell or offer for sale in New York City an automated employment decision tool 
that does not comply with the stated provisions, including a requirement that 
the tool “shall be the subject of a bias audit conducted in the past year prior to 
selling or offering for sale such tool.”285 “Bias audit” is defined as “an impartial 
evaluation, including but not limited to testing, of an automated employment 
decision tool to assess its predicted compliance with the provisions of section 
8-107 and any other applicable law relating to discrimination in 
employment.”286 Section 8-107 prohibits employment discrimination on the 
basis of “the actual or perceived age, race, creed, color, national origin, gender, 
disability, marital status, partnership status, caregiver status, sexual and 
reproductive health decisions, sexual orientation, uniformed service or alienage 
or citizenship status . . . .”287 However, this is not a federal bill, it does not 
attach to federal employment antidiscrimination law, and even if passed, it 
would apply only in New York City.  
 During the writing of this Article, Senators Cory Booker and Ron Wyden 
also proposed the Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, 288  with 
Representative Yvette Clarke sponsoring an equivalent bill in the House, 
 
282 David Gelles & David Yaffe Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Everything, Top C.E.O.s 
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceos-
corporations.html [https://perma.cc/4ZWW-5XEE]. 
283 THE INST. OF INTERNAL AUDITORS, INT’L STANDARDS FOR THE PROFESSIONAL 
PRACTICE OF INTERNAL AUDITING 23 (2016). 
284 Id.  





287 Id.  
288 Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, S. 116th Cong. (2019). 
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which comports with the auditing proposals I make here, but which I argue 
are missing key elements that would allow such audits to be useful. Notably, 
the proposed bill makes no mention of record-keeping or data retention 
mandates for automated hiring. An audit that does not include all relevant data 
will be ineffectual. Furthermore, this proposed bill is lacking a collaborative 
aspect. My proposal for an “Fair Automated Hiring Mark,” which I explain in 
more detail below, encourages employers to be actively invested in ensuring 
that their automated hiring systems are not biased.  In the questions below,  
      
1. Tear-off Sheets: What Information is Needed for 
Verification? 
 Professors David Lehr and Paul Ohm note several issues with machine 
learning algorithms. 289  Notably, they observe that many machine learning 
algorithms suffer from the problem of “over-fitting,” which happens when “a 
statistical method . . . identif[ies] as legitimate correlations due to randomness, 
including outliers, in the training data — randomness that will not be the same 
in the real-world data to which the algorithm is eventually applied.”290 This 
presents a problem for making real-world predictions because “if certain 
variables take on non-randomly extremely high or low values in the training 
and test data, but not in real-world data, the rules an algorithm learns to make 
predictions in the former may fail on the latter.”291 Thus, an essential part of 
the internal audit check is verifying the accuracy of predictions made by the 
automated hiring system. 
 Another issue that an internal audit should check for is inherited bias in 
the automated hiring system that could have a disparate impact on protected 
categories of applicants. To ask for an employer to audit whether a hiring 
system has had an adverse impact on applicants who are members of a 
protected class represents a paradox, as employers are typically not allowed to 
collect that information at the hiring stage. Professor Ignacio Cofone notes 
this paradox, and argues that the true solution is not just to regulate the “use” 
of the data, but to regulate the “acquisition” of such information.292  
 From an auditing standpoint, however, neither the use nor the acquisition 
of the information is as much a problem as the lack of such data. Thus, my 
proposal is a re-design of automated hiring system to have a “tear-off sheet” 
like traditional paper hiring used to have.293 This was an additional sheet that 
could be torn away from all paper applications before those applications were 
 
289 See David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About 
Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 670 (2017). 
290 Id. at 684. 
291 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
292 Ignacio N. Cofone, Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 
1389, 1392 (2019) (emphasis omitted).  
293 The EEOC noted in an informal discussion letter that “tear-off sheets” are lawful under 
Title VII because of a legitimate need for the information for affirmative action purposes or 
to track applicant flow. The EEOC Informal Discussion Letter, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Aug. 5, 2002), https://www.eeoc.gov/foia/eeoc-informal-
discussion-letter-78 [https://perma.cc/58M2-BUND]. 
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passed to the decision-maker. In the case of an automated hiring system, it is 
a simple method of writing code wherein demographic information (such as 
age, race, gender) is solicited from the job applicant but such protected 
information is segregated from the rest of the electronic application, and is 
embargoed, meaning decision-makers cannot access that information, until 
after a hiring decision has been made. Currently, many applications do solicit 
these types of demographic information, but only on a voluntary basis. This 
means that many applicants may choose not to share the information. Thus, 
my proposal is that provision of such information would be mandatory for 
automated hiring, and that the information regarding the initial sequestration 
of such information would be provided to applicants. 
2. Enhancing Applicant Selection: What Standards 
Should Apply? 
 Standards and best practices already exist for conducting an effective 
internal audit.294 As an international professional association, the Institute of 
Internal Auditors (“IIA”) gives guidance on internal auditing.295 For an internal 
audit to be considered effective, it should achieve ten core principles, which 
include “[d]emonstrat[ing] competence and due professional care” and “[being] 
insightful, proactive, and future-focused.”296 Also, as listed in the Institute’s 
Code of Ethics, internal auditors are expected to uphold the following 
principles: integrity, objectivity, confidentiality, and competency.297 The quality 
of the internal audit activity should also be assured through internal and 
external assessments, which are public reviews and day-to-day measurement, 
supervision, and review of the activities and assessment by an independent 
reviewer from outside of the organization, respectively.298 
 One genre of organizations that follow the IIA standards comprises bank 
and financial service companies.299 I have previously compared the fiduciary 
duties of banks to the fiduciary duties of platforms who serve as information 
fiduciaries to the job applicants, who entrust such platforms with their 
personal data.300 In banks, internal audits are required not only in terms of 
financial reporting, but also regarding legal compliance and general 
 
294 See, e.g., id. at 1–3. 
295 See Core Principles for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, INST. INTERNAL AUDITORS, 
https://na.theiia.org/standards-guidance/mandatory-guidance/Pages/Core-Principles-for-
the-Professional-Practice-of-Internal-Auditing.aspx [https://perma.cc/7GT6-AHGY]. 
296 Id.  
297 See Code of Ethics, INST. INTERNAL AUDITORS (Jan. 2009), https://na.theiia.org/standards-
guidance/Public%20Documents/IPPF_Code_of_Ethics_01-09.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D6YK-JYE2]. 
298 THE INST. OF INTERNAL AUDITORS, supra note 304; Matthew Bender, BANKS & THRIFTS: 
GOV’T ENFORCEMENT & RECEIVERSHIP § 5.04, 5–39 (2018). 
299 Federal banking regulators suggest that the internal audit function be conducted 
according to professional standards. See Michael E. Murphy, Assuring Responsible Risk 
Management in Banking: The Corporate Governance Dimension, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 121, 136–37 
(2011). 
300 See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Testing Meets Big Data: Torts and Contract Law Issues, 75 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1225 (2014). 
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effectiveness. 301  Relevant institutions have constantly emphasized the 
independence of these audits. The 2001 guidelines of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, the principal agency establishing international banking 
standards, states that “[a] bank’s internal audit function must be . . . 
independent from the everyday internal control process.” 302  Further, the 
guidance issued by a subcommittee of the Federal Reserve System emphasizes 
that such internal audit must “[be] independent from the day-to-day 
functioning of the bank and [have] access to all activities conducted by the 
banking organization.” 303  In support of this, the manuals of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Officer of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
and Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council advocate that internal 
auditors report “solely and directly” to the audit committee. 304 Given the risk 
of management interference, an audit committee should consist of outside 
directors, without reporting to their supervisors.305 
Internal self-auditing is also conducted and recommended in other types 
of industries, such as manufacturing sectors, because it helps the businesses 
meet the requirements of relevant laws. For instance, an occupational safety 
and health self-audit is an “assessment of workplace hazards, controls, 
programs, and documents performed by a business owner or employee” in 
compliance with OSHA regulations. 306 Yamin and his co-authors discuss the 
significance of occupational safety and health self-audits in manufacturing 
companies and suggest ideas to improve inter-rater reliability and accuracy in 
the process. 307  Furthermore, OSHA allows hiring a consultant within the 
company to perform self-audits when OSHA is not able to do an inspection 
immediately.308 
 Others have noted that self-audits can enhance CSR.309 The four levels of 
CSR self-audit allow companies to examine their performance in relation to ad 
hoc policy, standard policy, planned policy, and evaluated and reviewed 
policy.310 Furthermore, self-audits allow for strategic and operational business 
planning through identification of strengths and prevention of problems.311 
This genre of CSR self-audit process requires “proper training of self-auditors, 
 
301 See Murphy, supra note 320, at 136. 
302 Id. at 137 (citing BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNAL AUDIT IN BANKS 
AND THE SUPERVISOR’S RELATIONSHIP WITH AUDITORS 3 (2001)).  
303 Id. at 138 (citing BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, FRAMEWORK FOR 
INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS IN BANKING ORGANISATIONS 20–21 (1998)). 
304 See id. at 139; Gary M. Deutsch, RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS § 
27A.03[11][c], 27A-47 (2017). 
305 See Murphy, supra note 320, at 139. 
306 Samuel C. Yamin, David L. Parker, Min Xi & Rodney Stanley, Self-Audit of Lockout/Tagout 
in Manufacturing Workplaces: A Pilot Study, 60 AM. J. IND. MED. 504, 504 (2017). 
307 Id. at 504–06. 
308 See Martin v. Bally’s Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1252 (1993); Olivia K. 
LaBoda, Dueling Approaches to Dual Purpose Documents: The Reaches of the Work Product Doctrine 
After Textron, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 727, 737 (2011). 
309 See Peter Kok, Ton van der Wiele, Richard McKenna & Alan Brown, A Corporate Social 
Responsibility Audit within a Quality Management Framework, 31 J. BUS. ETHICS 285, 291–93 
(2001). 
310 See id. 
311 See Self-Audit for Quality Improvement, 18 STRATEGIC DIRECTION 5, 18 (2002). 
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allocation of sufficient time to perform the audit, preparation of audit aids, 
management support, and an adequate follow-up to audit findings.”312 
 There is a question of whether internal audits alone (or even in conjunction 
with external audits) are adequate for ensuring safe harbor from 
antidiscrimination laws which other scholars have addressed.313 I, however, 
maintain that internal audits can confer other benefits besides safe harbor. I 
argue that rather than merely serving as a protectionist tool against 
employment discrimination lawsuits, internal audits would benefit 
corporations interested in diversifying their personnel. Business scholars have 
shown that a workplace with diverse employees is ideal for achieving sought-
after business goals such as greater innovation.314 Thus, the internal audits 
could provide corporations with a tool to discover their blind spots in regard 
to preconceived notions of qualification and fit and might even help bring 
other problems of bias in hiring to the attention of the corporation. For 
example, the audits could shatter misconceptions as to qualifications by 
surfacing rejected candidates who nonetheless went on to become stellar 
employees at other companies. Or, the audits could reveal a rather shallow 
pool of diverse qualified applicants, indicating either a negative brand image 
for the company, work climate problems, or the need to establish a sturdier 
pipeline to the industry for diverse candidates. 
  
D.External Auditing: The Fair Automated Hiring Mark 
Given the proprietary nature of hiring algorithms, one approach that 
balances intellectual property protection concerns with the need for greater 
accountability is a certification system that operates on external third-party 
audits by an independent certifying entity. I take as inspiration for this 
proposed certification system Professors Ian Ayres and Jennifer Brown’s 
framework for corporations to certify discrimination-free workplaces that 
comply with the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”).315 The 
authors propose: 
 
[B]y entering into the licensing agreement with us, an employer gains 
the right (but not the obligation) to use the mark and in return 
 
312 Id. 
313 See, e.g., Pauline Kim, Safe Harbors for Algorithms? (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
314 See Katherine W. Phillips, Commentary to EARL LEWIS, NANCY CANTOR, KATHERINE 
PHILLIPS & SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIVERSITY BONUS: HOW GREAT TEAMS PAY OFF IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 223, 238 (2019) (showing that diverse groups outperform 
homogenous groups because of both an influx of new ideas and more careful information 
processing); see also Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles, 111 PROC. OF 
THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 18524 (2014). 
315 ENDA is legislation proposed in the United States Congress that would prohibit 
discrimination in hiring and employment on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity 
by employers with at least 15 employees. See generally Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, 
Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination: Privatizing ENDA with a Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1639 (2006). 
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promises to abide by the word-for-word strictures of ENDA. 
Displaying the mark signals to knowing consumers and employees that 
the company manufacturing the product or providing the service has 
committed itself not to discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation.316      
 
 Other legal scholars have also proposed certification systems for 
algorithms. Notably, Andrew Tutt has proposed an “FDA for algorithms,”      
in which the federal government would establish an agency to oversee different 
classes of algorithms to ensure that, much like food and medicine marketed 
for human consumption, those algorithms would pose no harm to those over 
whom they exercise decision-making power.317 And Professor Rory Van Loo 
makes a compelling case for regulatory monitoring of platforms that employ 
automated decision-making. 318  He defines regulatory monitoring as “the 
collection of information that the [government] agency can force a business to 
provide even without suspecting a particular act of wrongdoing.”319 Van Loo 
notes that key factors indicating a need for regulatory monitoring include: a 
public interest in preventing harm, information asymmetries, and a lack of faith 
in self-regulation.320   
 Given that these factors are undeniably present for automated hiring, I 
argue for either a government agency or a third-party non-governmental 
agency as auditing and certifying authority. The governmental agency could be 
under the aegis of the EEOC. Thus, the EEOC would audit and certify 
automated hiring platforms before those platforms could lawfully be deployed 
in the hiring process. However, given the financial and time burden such a 
certifying process could exact on governmental resources, a non-governmental 
entity, much like the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(“LEED”) certification system, is a good alternative. LEED was established in 
1993 “with a mission to promote sustainability-focused practices in the 
building industry.”321 Thus, LEED serves as a “green certification program for 
building design, construction, operations, and maintenance.”322 The LEED 
certification involves a formal certification letter, as well as plaques, signage 
for buildings, and an electronic badge that may be displayed on a website.323 
This third-party certification would not comprise of a one-time audit, but 
rather involve periodic audits of the hiring algorithms to check for disparate 
impact on vulnerable populations. Thus, this ongoing process would ensure 
 
316 Id. at 1641. 
317 See Tutt, supra note 4, at 83. 
318 Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of Surveillance, 72 
VAND. L. REV. 1563 (2019). 
319 Id. at 1574. 
320 Id. at 1573. 
321 Impact Conference, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, https://impact.usgbc.org/#about 
[https://perma.cc/VSM4-JNF3]. 
322 Global Dow Center Earns LEED Silver Certification, FACILITY EXECUTIVE, 
https://facilityexecutive.com/2020/01/global-dow-center-earns-leed-silver-certification 
[https://perma.cc/B7PQ-PKCT]. 
323 See Congrats! You’ve Earned LEED Certification., U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, 
https://new.usgbc.org/post-certification [https://perma.cc/2RE3-HWUA]. 
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that the audited corporations and organizations continue to hew to fair 
automated hiring practices. In return, the corporation or organization would 
earn the right to use a Fair Automated Hiring Mark (“FAHM”; see illustration 
of a potential mark below) for its online presence, for communication 
materials, and for display on hiring advertisements to attract a more diverse 








   Figure 1: The Proposed Fair Automated Hiring Mark 
 
 I envision that such a third-party certification entity would be composed 
of multi-disciplinary teams of auditors comprising both lawyers and either 
software engineers or data scientists who would audit the hiring algorithms 
employed by corporations and organizations. This strategy would prevent 
some of the tunnel-vision problems associated with technology created 
without consideration for legal frameworks and broader societal goals. 
Furthermore, such a certification system could serve as a feedback mechanism 
and thus enable better design and best practices for automated hiring systems. 
1. The Pros and Cons of a Governmental Certifying 
System 
A governmental certification that is federally mandated would provide 
uniformity in the practice of automated hiring and would also ensure 
compliance in regard to auditing. 324  However, the issues of regulatory 
capture 325  and political windshifts weigh against the adoption of a 
governmental certifying system. As history has shown, governmental agencies 
are vulnerable to regulatory capture,326 meaning that private influence on the 
workings of such agencies, as well as political wind shifts, can render such 
agencies toothless or ineffectual. While there are varying definitions of 
 
324 Some legal scholars have previously argued for governmental oversight based on a 
taxonomy of the distinct operations of algorithmic systems in a wide range of spheres. See 
Desai & Kroll, supra note 285, at 42–55. My proposed interventions in this Article focus 
solely on the employment sphere. 
325 Daniel Carpenter and David Moss define “regulatory capture” as “the result or process by 
which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the 
public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of 
the industry itself.” DANIEL CARPENTER & DAVID A. MOSS, PREVENTING REGULATORY 
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 13 (2014). 
326 See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against 
Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679 (2012) (highlighting the inherent connection between the 
public and private enforcement of securities laws); see also David Freeman Engstrom, 
Corralling Capture, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 35–37 (2013) (arguing that the structural 
conditions that facilitate regulatory capture naturally move legislatures and agencies 
together). 
  FAHM 
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regulatory capture, “[w]hat is true, however, is that because the top officials of 
federal regulatory agencies are presidential appointees, interest groups, 
whether they are industries, unions, or consumer or environmental groups, 
influence the regulatory agencies, and one can think of this influence as a kind 
of capture.”327 
 Examples of regulatory capture abound in American government, 
including that of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),328 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”),329 and most importantly the 
EEOC.330 Most recently, an in-depth investigative report by The New Yorker 
revealed the staggering extent of the regulatory capture of the FDA by Purdue 
Pharma, a privately held company established by the Sackler family and which 
developed the prescription painkiller OxyContin.331 The painkiller, which is 
almost twice as powerful as morphine, has been at the forefront of the current 
American opioid crisis, as it was extensively marketed for long-term pain relief 
despite medical evidence of its addictive properties. 332  The FDA, without 
corroborating evidence from clinical trials, approved a package insert for 
OxyContin that stated the drug was safer than competing painkillers — the 
FDA examiner who approved the package insert, Dr. Curtis Wright, was hired 
at Purdue Pharma soon after he left the FDA.333 
 In the employment context specifically, the EEOC, which is charged with 
employment regulation, has also been susceptible to administration change. 
Consider, for example, that in 2014 President Obama issued a presidential 
memorandum on pay data transparency 334 instructing the Secretary of Labor 
to propose a regulation mandating that federal contractors must disclose pay 
 
327 CARPENTER & MOSS, supra note 346, at 54 (2014). 
328 Other scholars have detailed a revolving door of SEC employees to and from the 
financial sector and how it has contributed to regulatory capture of the SEC. See, e.g., Stewart 
L. Brown, Mutual Funds and the Regulatory Capture of the SEC, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 701, 
707 (2017). 
329 See Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family That Built an Empire of Pain, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-an-
empire-of-pain [https://perma.cc/5W8K-UPK2] (discussing how a family-owned business 
co-opted the FDA drug certification system through fraud and corruption). 
330 Consider that the Trump administration attempted to suspend a pay data collection rule 
that had been promulgated by the Obama administration to combat the gender pay gap 
through transparency in pay. See Alexia Fernández Campbell, Trump Tried to Sabotage a Plan to 
Close the Gender Pay Gap. A Judge Wouldn’t Have It., VOX (Apr. 26, 2019, 10:10 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2019/4/26/18515920/gender-pay-gap-rule-eeoc 
[https://perma.cc/6PSR-JTGV]. 
331 Keefe, supra note 350. 
332 See id. 
333 See id. (detailing how OxyContin lobbied for the insert in order to increase its market 
share of drug sales). 
334 See Bourree Lam, Obama’s New Equal-Pay Rules, ATLANTIC (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/eeoc-pay-discrimination-
obama/433926/ [https://perma.cc/5K3Q-KZTW]; see also Press Release, The White House, 
Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: New Steps to Advance Equal Pay on the Seventh 
Anniversary of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/29/fact-sheet-new-steps-
advance-equal-pay-seventh-anniversary-lilly [https://perma.cc/29TM-V87Y]. 
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data broken down by race and gender to the EEOC. 335  This presidential 
memorandum meant to combat gender gaps in pay.336 However, in 2017, the 
Acting Chair of the EEOC, appointed by President Trump, issued a press 
release announcing an immediate stay of the EEOC regulation.337 
2. The Pros and Cons of a Third-Party Non-
Governmental Certifying System 
 A commercial third-party certifying entity with a business reputation to 
protect would be much less susceptible to regulatory capture. For one, given 
the voluntary nature of the relationship between the certifying entity and the 
employer using automated hiring systems, there is much less of an impetus for 
regulatory capture in the first place. Thus, the FAHM mark, rather than 
representing a mere rubber stamp, will come to serve as a reputable market 
signal for employers who are truly interested in creating a more diverse 
workplace. Notably, a non-governmental entity would better withstand the 
vagaries of political wind shifts like those that influenced the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”)338 and the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) regarding net neutrality339 or the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) regarding climate change.340 
 One argument, however, is that even independent third-party certifying 
agencies are not immune to capture. As such entities will derive an economic 
benefit from certifications, there is the danger that such an agency could 
 
335 See Lam, supra note 355. 
336 See Press Release, The White House, supra note 355. 
337 See Danielle Paquette, The Trump Administration Just Halted This Obama-Era Rule to Shrink the 




338 See Brian Fung, The House Just Voted to Wipe Away the FCC’s Landmark Internet Privacy 
Protections, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2017, 7:37 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/28/the-house-just-
voted-to-wipe-out-the-fccs-landmark-internet-privacy-protections/ 
[https://perma.cc/LAV4-LLTE]; see also Jeff Dunn, Trump Just Killed Obama’s Internet-Privacy 
Rules — Here’s What That Means for You, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 4, 2017, 10:55 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-fcc-privacy-rules-repeal-explained-2017-4 
[https://perma.cc/VE5S-WD5N]. 
339 See Michael Santorelli, After Net Neutrality: The FTC Is the Sheriff of Tech Again. Is It Up to the 
Task?, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2017, 11:44 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2017/12/15/the-game-is-on-the-ftc-tech-
regulation-post-net-neutrality/ [https://perma.cc/Q4MF-DZ3C] (noting the FTC’s stance 
against net neutrality). 
340 See Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, How Scott Pruitt Turned the EPA into One of Trump’s Most 
Powerful Tools, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/under-scott-pruitt-a-year-of-
tumult-and-transformation-at-epa/2017/12/26/f93d1262-e017-11e7-8679-
a9728984779c_story.html [https://perma.cc/M7YM-UM5H]; see also Eric Lipton & Danielle 
Ivory, Under Trump, EPA Has Slowed Actions Against Polluters, and Put Limits on Enforcement 
Officers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/10/us/politics/pollution-epa-regulations.html 
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become a mere rubber-stamping entity without adequate legal teeth to enforce 
any sanctions against the entities it is certifying. However, said agency would 
operate on the trust of job applicants as consumers, and the internet also 
affords greater information dissemination. Thus, consumers in the form of job 
applicants can now more forcefully make their voices heard regarding 
algorithmic bias and could still blow the whistle341 on any misconduct, in turn 
undermining any certifying mark that does not hold true. 
 Another valid concern regarding external auditing agencies is the privacy 
of applicant data. In particular, there is a need for regulation regarding the end 
uses of applicant data derived from third-party audits of automated hiring. For 
one, there should be regulations prohibiting third-party vendors from selling 
data derived from applicant information. In the absence of such regulation, 
companies undertaking a third-party audit could enter into contractual 
agreements barring the use of applicant data beyond the purposes of the audit, 
including the sale or transfer of that data to other parties. 
  A recent audit by Hirevue may yet provide the best contrary argument 
against third party auditing. In 2019, the nonprofit Electronic Privacy 
Information Center lodged a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) alleging that HireVue’s use of AI to assess job candidate’s video 
interviews constituted “unfair and deceptive trade practices.” 342  While 
HireVue denied any wrongdoing, in 2020, HireVue announced it would cease 
to include a candidate’s facial expressions in video interviews as a factor its 
algorithms considered.343 On January 11, 2021, HireVue announced that it had 
brought in the auditing entity, O’Neil Risk Consulting and Algorithmic 
Auditing (“ORCAA”), to conduct an audit of its video interviewing system.344 
The report of the audit, however, left many questions unanswered. For one, 
ORCAA limited the audit to “pre-built assessments used in hiring early career 
candidates, including from college campuses.”345 This audit does not assess 
what HireVue calls “custom assessments,” special algorithms which 
companies may commission that “are designed around job-related outcomes 
specified by the client” with the potential purpose to “predict what a 
candidate’s job performance would be, were that candidate hired.” 346 
 
341 See Katyal, supra note 4, at 107–08 (making a powerful argument for the importance of 
whistleblowers in rectifying algorithmic bias). Other legal scholars have also made the same 
argument while noting how trade secret laws might interfere with whistleblowing. See Desai 
& Kroll, supra note 285, at 56–64 (2017). 
342 Complaint and Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief Submitted by The 
Electronic Privacy Information Center at 1, In the Matter of HireVue Inc. (2019), 
https://epic.org/privacy/ftc/hirevue/EPIC_FTC_HireVue_Complaint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G36P-2W9E]. 
343 Jeremy Kahn, HireVue Drops Facial Monitoring Amid A.I. Algorithm Audit, FORTUNE (Jan. 
19, 2021), https://fortune.com/2021/01/19/hirevue-drops-facial-monitoring-amid-a-i-
algorithm-audit/ [https://perma.cc/APC2-6B5S]. 
344 See Lindsey Zuloaga, Industry Leadership: New Audit Results and Decision on Visual Analysis, 
HIREVUE (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.hirevue.com/blog/hiring/industry-leadership-new-
audit-results-and-decision-on-visual-analysis [https://perma.cc/3LZE-QHTB]. 
345 O’NEIL RISK CONSULTING AND ALGORITHMIC AUDITING, DESCRIPTION OF 
ALGORITHMIC AUDIT: PRE-BUILT ASSESSMENTS 1 (2020) (on file with author). 
346 Id. at 2. 
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Ultimately, ORCAA recommended that HireVue do more to communicate to 
candidates exactly what the interview process will involve and how their 
answers will be screened. 
 Limiting the scope of the audit to “pre-built” assessments means a 
potentially damning majority of HireVue use cases may have been excluded 
from the purview of the audit.347 ORCAA acknowledges this reality in the audit 
report, claiming “the use case we audited is not necessarily common or 
representative of HireVue’s business overall” but rather supposedly reflects 
what HireVue believes is a use case that “would prompt hard fairness 
questions.”348 Even though an audit of custom assessments algorithms may be 
more difficult to conduct because those algorithms vary in nature, many 
concerns raised about HireVue center around bias replication by algorithms 
that rely on job performance and hiring data from existing companies.349 This 
audit does not consider such concerns. Further, the applicability of the results 
of this audit to decisions about the suitability of HireVue technology as a whole 
heavily depends on the significance of the pre-built assessment use case, data 
on which is currently unavailable to the general public. If the pre-built 
assessment use case is a minor part of HireVue’s business model, then this 
audit is practically insignificant. A more meaningful audit would require 
examining multiple use-case scenarios for fairness to understand the potential 
discriminatory effects of the most commons ways that HireVue’s product is 
deployed. The auditing report should include demographic information about 
total applicants screened under each use case and any disproportionate impact on 
protected categories. Despite these inadequacies, the fact that HireVue 
voluntarily undertook this independent third-party audit is welcome 
development in oversight of automated hiring systems. Hirevue did also 
identify further investigation as to potential bias arising from the AI evaluation 
of different accents and also length of responses.350 In all, I argue that the 
HireVue audit, as the first of its kind, underscores the need to create industry 
standards or guidelines for third-party independent audits and, perhaps, for 
governmental mandated audits conducted by a governmental agency with 
standardized procedures. 
 
347 While HireVue does not share details on the type and frequency of their use cases, 
evidence suggests that the company is commissioned to create custom assessments by some 
major clients. See Unilever + HireVue, HIREVUE, https://www.hirevue.com/case-
studies/global-talent-acquisition-unilever-case-study [https://perma.cc/3N5M-5HCF] 
(describing that HireVue claims its algorithms assessed “those candidates that are most likely 
to be successful at Unilever,” implying that the Unilever algorithm was a custom assessment 
designed to predict potential job performance at Unilever). 
348 O’NEILL RISK CONSULTING AND ALGORITHMIC AUDITING, supra note 313, at 2. 
349 See Rachel Winters, Should Robots Be Conducting Job Interviews?, Slate (Oct. 5, 2020, 9AM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2020/10/artificial-intelligence-job-interviews.html; Fin. 
Times, Companies Tout 'Bullet Proof' AI Recruiting Tools, But Critics Warn They Will Replicate 
Human Biases, Fin. Post: Fin. Times (June 5, 2020), https://financialpost.com/financial-
times/companies-tout-bullet-proof-ai-recruiting-tools-but-critics-warn-they-will-replicate-
human-biases; Sarah Fister Gale, Could Video Interviewing Land You in Court?, Workforce (July 
1, 2019), https://www.workforce.com/news/video-interviewing-land-you-in-court.  
350 O’NEILL RISK CONSULTING AND ALGORITHMIC AUDITING, supra note 313, at 4–5. 
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 This last point especially rises from the skepticism of experts regarding 
internal audits. Dipayan Ghosh, a Harvard fellow and former Facebook 
privacy and public policy official, has no confidence in any internal review 
process given past cases of self-certifying companies revealed to be engaging 
in practices that were harmful to society and certain populations.351 According 
to Ghosh: “The public will have little knowledge as to whether or not the firm 
really is making biased decisions if it’s only the firm itself that has access to its 
decision-making algorithms to test them for discriminatory outcomes.” 352 
Ghosh notes that start-ups do not face enough pressure to use third-party audit 
firms because it is “not required by law,” “costs money,” and would “require 
‘tremendous levels’ of compliance beyond what internal audits likely 
require.”353  
 Given the example of regulation in other jurisdictions, where for example 
the GDPR denotes algorithm audits as essential for the public good, 
particularly for protecting those who are already marginalized citizens,354 or the 
example of the Sarbanes Oxley-Act which mandates auditor independence and 
also requires that internal officers certify financial reports quarterly, 355  I 
propose that corporations employing automated hiring systems should be 
mandated to engage in both internal and external audits of such systems, and I 
lay out the case for each type of audit in the following sections and also discuss 
the potential downfalls for each system. 
 
E. Collective Bargaining 
 While internal and external audits could both enable litigation by 
generating data to serve as statistical evidence of disparate impact or by 
uncovering practices that could be considered discrimination per se, collective 
bargaining as a collaborative exercise between employers and worker unions 
could also set fair standards for automated hiring and securing applicant data. 
In this section, I argue that collective bargaining provides another avenue to 
check some of the deleterious effects of automated hiring. Notably, collective 
bargaining could focus on the role of data collection and usage. The target of 
such bargaining would be trifold: 1) agreements as to what data will be digested 
by automated hiring systems; that is, setting the standards for probative 
applicant assessment criteria; 2) agreements as to the end uses of such data; that 
is, contractual agreements as to what the data collected will be used for, as well 
as data-retention agreements; and 3) agreements as to the control and 
portability of the data created by automated hiring systems. 
 
351 See Rosenbaum, supra note 286. 
352 Id. 
353 Id. 
354 See id. (“In recruiting – a space in which sensitive and life-changing decisions are made all 
the time in which we accordingly have established strong civil rights protections – . . . 
algorithmic bias [is] especially important to detect and act against.”)  
355 See generally, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107–204 (text) (pdf), 116 Stat. 745, 
enacted July 30, 2002). 
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 While there has been much focus on the data input required for automated 
decision-making, the data generated by this decision-making process is equally 
consequential, if not more so. This is because automated hiring systems hold 
the potential to create indelible portraits of applicants, which may be used to 
classify those individuals. 356  As a result, data submitted by an applicant is 
deployed not just for one job classification or even presented to just one 
employer. Rather, an applicant-data-generated worker profile may live on past 
the snapshot in time when the worker applied for a specific position and may 
come to haunt them during an entirely different bid for employment.357 In the 
following sections, I detail the important role of collective bargaining in 
achieving fair standards not only for the curation of input data, but also for 
the portability of output data. 
1. Data Digested and Determining Probative 
Evaluation Criteria 
 Arguments over standards of fairness and other approaches to algorithmic 
accountability tend to neglect the role of data in perpetuating discrimination. 
Yet, as several legal scholars have observed, data is not neutral; rather, it is 
tainted by structural and institutional bias.358 Collective bargaining regarding 
what data may be used for assessment as part of algorithmic hiring systems is 
one necessary approach to curbing employment discrimination. While the 
content of hiring criteria is typically not a topic of collective bargaining — 
collective bargaining tends to focus on the conditions of employment for 
workers who have already been hired — I argue that union leaders should not 
overlook the importance of securing fair data collection and evaluation 
standards for their members. There is also the argument that unions may tend 
to prioritize a focus on securing good working conditions for current 
employees. Yet, with the decline in union membership, securing good hiring 
conditions could be a boon for unions. 
 The first task for unions to tackle is negotiating what data may be digested 
by hiring algorithms. A crucial issue for this negotiation will be determining 
what data is probative of “job fitness” or what data may even be considered 
job-related. Professor Sullivan notes: “The employer’s reliance on the 
algorithm may be job-related, but the algorithm itself is measuring and tracking 
behavior that has no direct relationship to job performance.”359 And while 
some of the information digested by hiring algorithms may be correlated with 
 
356 Professors Rick Bales and Katherine Stone have argued: “The data collected are 
transformed by means of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms into a permanent electronic 
resume that companies are using to track and assess current workers, and it could potentially 
be shared among companies as workers move around the boundaryless workplace from job 
to job.” Bales & Stone, supra note 60, at 3. 
357 Id. at 3–4 (“This invisible electronic web threatens to invade worker privacy, deter 
unionization, enable subtle forms of employer blackballing, exacerbate employment 
discrimination, render unions ineffective, and obliterate the protections of the labor laws.”). 
358 See Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the Transparency 
Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 973, 982 (2016); 
see also Chander, supra note 146, at 1039. 
359 See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 421. 
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job success, as other scholars have noted: “If a statistical correlation were 
sufficient to satisfy the defense of job-relatedness, the standard would be a 
tautology rather than a meaningful legal test.”360 
 Rather than rely on flimsy and often irrelevant correlations excavated by 
the algorithms, I concur with legal scholars who have argued that the Uniform 
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures361 should apply in negotiating 
what data will be digested by automated hiring systems. 362 363  Although these 
guidelines do not amount to law,364 they have been accorded deference in case 
law 365  and have been viewed as authoritative in deciding employment 
discrimination cases. 366  As Professor Sullivan notes: “While [the Uniform 
Guidelines] have been used mainly for the validation of traditional paper-and-
pencil tests with a disparate impact , the Guidelines broadly apply to any 
‘selection procedure.’” 367  
 The Uniform Guidelines are useful because they set standards for when 
selection criteria could be considered valid. The Guidelines provide for 
“three kinds of validation: criterion, content, and construct.”368 The aim of all 
 
360 See DATA-DRIVEN DISCRIMINATION AT WORK, supra note 5, at 920. 
361 Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (2021). 
362 See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 420–22; King & Mrkonich, supra note 101, at 574. 
363  
364 SSee Sullivan, supra note 14, at 422. 
365 The Court in Griggs concluded that the EEOC’s interpretation of the guidelines should be 
given “great deference.” See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971). Later 
in Moody, the Court further observed that the “[g]uidelines draw upon and make reference to 
professional standards of test validation established by the American Psychological 
Association” and that while the guidelines were “not administrative ‘regulations’ 
promulgated pursuant to formal procedures established by the Congress . . . they do 
constitute ‘[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency.’” 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430–31 (1975) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 
433–34). The Uniform Guidelines replaced the original EEOC guidelines in 1978 and it 
enjoys broader consensus than the EEOC guidelines as it represents the collective view of 
the EEOC and other federal agencies such as the Department of Labor, the Civil Service 
Commission, and the Department of Justice. Thus, courts have similarly viewed the 
Guidelines as authoritative. The court in Gulino noted: “[T]hirty-five years of using these 
Guidelines makes them the primary yardstick by which we measure defendants’ attempt to 
validate [a standardized certification test].” Gulino v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 
384 (2d Cir. 2006). 
366 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 422 n.106 (noting that per the results of a Lexis Advance search 
on Dec. 10, 2017, “[t]he Guidelines have been cited in more than 300 cases, including a 
number of Supreme Court decisions”). 
367 Id. at 422 nn.107–08 (citations omitted). See, also Sullivan, supra note 14, at 422 n.108 (“29 
C.F.R § 1607.3(A) (2018) (‘[T]he hiring, promotion, or other employment or membership 
opportunities of members of any race, sex, or ethnic group will be considered to be 
discriminatory and inconsistent with these guidelines, unless the procedure has been 
validated in accordance with these guidelines . . . .’). ‘Selection procedure’ is in turn defined 
broadly to include ‘[a]ny measure, combination of measures, or procedure used as a basis for 
any employment decision,’ and includes ‘the full range of assessment techniques from 
traditional paper and pencil tests, performance tests, training programs, or probationary 
periods and physical, educational, and work experience requirements through informal or 
casual interviews and unscored application forms.’ 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(Q) (2018).”). 
368 Id. at 423 (citing RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF 
DISCRIMINATION §§ 5.13–.17 (2d ed. 2017–2018)). 
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three types of validation is to prompt the employer to provide evidence of a 
predictive causal relationship between the selection method and the job 
performance: 
 
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a 
criterion-related validity study should consist of empirical data 
demonstrating that the selection procedure is predictive of or 
significantly correlated with important elements of job performance. 
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a 
content validity study should consist of data showing that the content 
of the selection procedure is representative of important aspects of 
performance on the job for which the candidates are to be evaluated. 
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure through 
a construct validity study should consist of data showing that the 
procedure measures the degree to which candidates have identifiable 
characteristics which have been determined to be important in 
successful performance in the job for which the candidates are to be 
evaluated.369 
 
As validation generally requires a job analysis, unions can be actively involved 
in conducting the job analysis and in thus setting the standards to demonstrate 
that: 1) the selection criteria for the hiring algorithm relate to important aspects 
of the job, 2) the data used actually allows for a prediction of future job 
performance based on the selection, and 3) the candidate selections are not the 
result of some nebulous correlation but rather indicate identifiable 
characteristics that are causally related to better job performance. A question 
arises here as to whether unions will have the requisite technical savvy to 
understand and implement these measures. This dilemma underscores the 
need for greater attention to law and technology courses in law school to train 
the next generation of union leaders, ensuring they remain competent to 
address the next generation of workplace technologies. 
 But even after the determination of probative data for job fitness, there 
still remains the problem of biased data. For example, data that may be 
probative for job fitness, such as test scores, may still bear the taint of past 
biased decisions. Consider for example that racial housing segregation has 
resulted in a concentration of better-resourced schools in majority-white 
neighborhoods where students who attend receive better preparation for 
standardized tests. Although performance on standardized tests may be 
considered probative of job fitness, the use of such a criterion could result in 
disparate impact. In recognition of the historical taint of structural bias on data 
that could otherwise be probative, some scholars have called for “algorithmic 
affirmative action,” which focuses not merely on the design of algorithms, but 
also on transparency about the biases encoded in the data and the correction 
of the data used.370  
 
369 Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5B (2018)) (cross references omitted in original). 
370 See Chander, supra note 146, at 1039. 
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 Alternatively, employers could outright reject the use of such biased data. 
For example, rather than depend on standardized testing, employers might 
design video games to assess job performance qualities of applicants, such as 
“social intelligence, ‘goal-orientation fluency,’ implicit learning, task-switching 
ability, and conscientiousness.”371 According to David Savage and Professor 
Richard Bales, these algorithms, which only identify individual personal 
qualities, can reduce discrimination in evaluating job applicants. 372 
Administering video games based on such algorithm in the initial hiring 
process not only will decrease disparate treatment and disparate impact 
discrimination because they test for individual skill sets, but they might also 
reduce unconscious biases in evaluation of job candidates.373 
  
2. Data End Uses and Fairness by Design 
 One common retort to addressing bias in algorithms is that machine 
learning algorithms are ungovernable; 374  however, like other legal scholars, I 
argue that the adjusting the design features of hiring platforms coupled with 
auditing mandates  facilitate antidiscrimination ends because  thus bringing 
them under a rule of law. More specifically, I argue that fairness can be part of 
the design of these algorithmic systems from the outset, especially for 
establishing data-retention features as a standard. These machine learning 
algorithms, which have the capacity to derive new models as they learn from 
large datasets, are constantly reevaluating the variable inputs of calculations. 
Some researchers have argued that humans could lose their agency over 
algorithms given the extensive potential of algorithms for calculations and the 
amount of data they use.375 To limit this reduction in choice-making power, 
some have exhorted that humans need to set “checks” on algorithms, ensuring 
that humans can inspect both the data that enters the system and the results 
that exit.376 By doing so, humans might reduce the chance that algorithms 
would grow to be unintelligible over time. For example, IBM’s Watson 
algorithm allows periodic inspections by presenting researchers with the 
documents it uses to form the basis for its decisions.377 
 
371 See David D. Savage & Richard Bales, Video Games in Job Interviews: Using Algorithms to 
Minimize Discrimination and Unconscious Bias, 32 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 211, 222 (2017) 
(quoting Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watching-you-at-
work/354681 [https://perma.cc/9792-WSKK]). 
372 Id. at 224–26. 
373 Id. 
374 See, e.g., Kroll et al., supra note 145 (noting that some existing algorithmic systems are 
largely ungovernable because they were not built with auditing in mind. They note also that 
there are ways to build for auditing, but that this design logic should exist at the onset). 
375 Katherine J. Strandburg, Rulemaking. and Inscrutable Automated Decision Tools, 119 
COLUMBIA L. REV. 1851, 1852 (2019) 
376 Madalina Busuioc, Accountable Artificial Intelligence: Holding Algorithms to Account, 
Pub. Admin. Rev. at 2 (unpublished manuscript), doi: 10.1111/puar.13293. 
377 Francesca Rossi, How IBM Is Working Toward a Fairer AI, 
Harv. Bus. Rev. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/11/how-ibm-is-working-toward-a-fairer-ai#. 
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 By complying with key standards of legal fairness when determining design 
features, programmers can reduce discriminatory effects of hiring algorithms, 
such that the algorithms avoid disparate impact for protected classes and 
comply with the principles of employment antidiscrimination laws. 378 
Professor MacCarthy notes that there are disputes about statistical concepts of 
fairness, especially between group fairness and individual fairness, because 
some believe that antidiscrimination laws aim at practices that disadvantage 
certain groups, while others think these laws “target arbitrary misclassification 
of individuals.” 379  Those that support group fairness measures, such as 
statistical parity380 and equal group error rates, try to reduce the subordination 
of disadvantaged groups by allowing for some sacrifice of accuracy. 381  As 
notions of fairness diverge, organizations must choose which standard to 
adopt by considering the context of use as well as normative and legal 
standards.382  
 I argue that to achieve fairness by design for automated hiring systems, it 
is also important to incorporate record-keeping and data-retention 
mechanisms as part of the standard design. Determining disparate impact in 
hiring algorithms is a relatively simple matter of evaluating the outcomes using 
the EEOC rule.383 This rule mandates that “[a] selection rate for any race, sex, 
or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths  . . . of the rate for the group with 
the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies 
as evidence of adverse impact.”384 Currently, however,  job applicants who do 
not make it past the hiring algorithm are typically lost to the ether.385 Thus, 
there is no sure way for plaintiffs to compare relative percentages of job 
applicants who were hired from protected categories against the number who 
applied as required by the EEOC rule,386 and there is still no clear method to 
confirm best hiring outcomes against the actual pool of qualified applicants. 
As the data from automated hiring systems remains solely in the control of the 
employer, appropriate record-keeping and data-retention procedures are 
necessary to enable disparate impact claims.   
 
378 See Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for Disparate Impact Assessment of Big Data 
Algorithms, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 67, 77–78 (2018). 
379 Id. at 68. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) (providing 
background for the development of competing theories on equal protection law); Jack M. 
Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or 
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIA. L. REV. 9 (2003) (relating the history of the development and 
application of two distinct antidiscrimination principles in American law). 
380 Proponents of statistical parity argue that it is more desirable because it “equalizes 
outcomes across protected and non-protected groups.” See Cynthia Dwork, Moritz Hardt, 
Toniann Pitassi, Omer Reingold & Richard Zemel, Fairness Through Awareness, 3 
INNOVATIONS IN THEORETICAL COMPUT. SCI. CONF. 214, 215 (2012). 
381 See MacCarthy, supra note 386, at 68. 
382 See MacCarthy, supra note 386, at 71. 
383 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2020). 
384 Id.  
385 See O’NEIL, supra note 1 at Chapter 4. 
386 See 29 C.F.R. §1607.4(D) (2020). 
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 It thwarts the purpose of the EEOC rule if automated hiring systems do 
not retain data when an applicant from a protected category is prevented from 
completing an application or do not even retain the data of complete but 
unsuccessful applications. My proposal for a legal requirement for 
corporations to deploy only automated hiring systems with data-retention 
mechanisms would ensure that data from failed job applicants is preserved so 
that it can later be compared against that of the successful applicants, with the 
aim of discovering whether the data evinces disparate impact regarding the 
population of failed applicants. Although there are valid privacy concerns with 
the retention of applicant data, I believe they can be addressed by embargoing 
the data at the initial stage, and by a hard deletion of the data after a specified 
time. There would also be steep penalties attached to re-selling the data or co-
opting it for end uses besides those expressly assented to by the applicants.   
Responsible record-keeping and data-retention are also necessary for 
conducting both internal and external audits. The data for internal audits serves 
two purposes: 1) it will alert employers to any disparate impact created by the 
automated hiring system, thus allowing them to preemptively correct any 
imbalances and avoid costly lawsuits; and 2) it might also alert employers to 
more structural issues present in their hiring. Such structural issues might 
include: 1) mismatched or non-probative selection criteria; 2) a shallow hiring 
pool for applicants from protected categories; and 3) technical or accessibility 
problems present in the automated hiring platform. Thus, the data from 
internal audits may offer a direct benefit to employers that is separate from 
their duty not to discriminate.387 Such a boon should be counted in any cost-
benefit analysis388 of my proposed record-keeping and data-retention measures. 
  
3. Data Control and Portability 
 Earlier in the Article, I noted the vast expanse of information collected by 
hiring platforms, for this section I note how the indelibility of the data profiles 
created by automated hiring systems could also enable employment 
discrimination. Moreover, these data profiles, some of which are created by 
third-party automated hiring vendors, contain not just information provided 
by the job applicant, but also data gleaned from online sources (such as social 
 
387 See, e.g., BIAS IN THE AIR, supra note 25, at 1384 (2014) (arguing that employment law 
should impose a duty of care on employers to refrain from practices that go against equal 
opportunity in employment); see also Robert Post, Lecture, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of 
American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 40 (2000) (arguing that 
antidiscrimination law aims to achieve positive intervention and change in social practices as 
opposed to solely dictating prohibitions). Other professors have also used a “duty of care” 
framework to propose remedial measures for employment discrimination. See NEGLIGENT 
DISCRIMINATION, supra note 28, at 933; see also MANAGING THE MACAW, supra note 29, at 
1364. I later discuss why the duty not to engage in practices that negate equal opportunity 
supports my external audit proposal. 
388 Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Lecture, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-
Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 161 (1984) (arguing that there is a “pernicious 
tendency” for cost-benefit analysis to “dwarf soft variables” in constitutional law). 
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media profiles) and peddled by gray market data brokers.389 Therefore, such 
information may include errors or could provide an inaccurate portrait of the 
applicant as construed from the erroneous data.390 Even if the information 
contained in the profile is accurate, there is also the issue of “context 
collapse,”391 wherein information the applicant provided in the context of 
applying for one specific job position may inappropriately be revived to 
evaluate the candidate for another job position. 
 Given these problems, applicant control and agency over both data 
collection and the portability of any created applicant profiles are crucial 
matters. Thus, as part of collective bargaining, unions should negotiate with 
employers regarding how applicant data will be handled. There is some tension 
here between data retention for the purpose of facilitating audits and 
applicants’ control of their data. But that tension is easily resolved by data 
anonymization and aggregation. The relevant data for audits here is 
demographic data that reveal protected characteristics. Unions can negotiate 
with firms not to retain or trade in applicant profiles that contain not just 
demographic data but sensitive personal information and evaluations about 
applicant fitness. 
4. Preventing “Algorithmic Blackballing” 
 Negotiations regarding the retention of subjective applicant profiles or 
evaluations are necessary to avoid what I term “algorithmic blackballing.” 
When applicant profiles are allowed to live on past their shelf life, such profiles 
may come to haunt the applicant in a different bid for work, whether with the 
 
389 See, e.g., Web Scraping as a Valuable Instrument for Proactive Hiring, DATAHEN (Apr. 5, 2017), 
https://www.datahen.com/web-scraping-valuable-instrument-proactive-hiring/ 
[https://perma.cc/2DQY-QQAY] (“What can recruiters do to use this huge advantage to 
their benefit? They can scrape or crawl data off of those kind [sic] of job portals and run 
analytics through it. By doing so they are able to determine the likelihood of filling a 
particular position in a specified location based on historical data patterns. Everything is 
relevant and important here and can impact the results of the research. Every little nuance, 
like the day of the week, [sic] certain types of jobs should be posted or other kinds of factors 
that will influence the decision making of the prospective candidate.”). 
390 Consider the case of Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Association, where the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that defendant SARMA had created an erroneous 
profile for Thompson by automatically “capturing” the incorrect social security number for 
his profile and erroneously reporting the bad credit history of another man by the same 
common name. Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchs. Ass’n., 682 F.2d 509, 509 (5th Cir. 
1982). See also Spokeo v. Robins, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (holding that a “people 
search engine” provided incorrect personal information about a consumer to employers, and 
further that the consumer may not be able to show concrete injury). 
391 Scholars have used the term “context collapse” to describe the phenomenon when 
communication that is meant for one particular audience is transported to another 
(dissimilar) audience without context or translation, resulting in misunderstanding or 
acrimony. See, e.g., Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, I Tweet Honestly, I Tweet Passionately: Twitter 
Users, Context Collapse, and the Imagined Audience, 13 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 114, 122 (2010). 
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same employer or, if traded, with another employer. 392  Absent any quick 
federal action to regulate this, unions could have a role to play.  
 Consider this scenario: John applies for work through the hiring platform 
of a major corporation. This platform creates profiles of all applicants. From 
those profiles, the employer chooses a subset of applicants to invite for 
interviews and rejects the rest. However, the hiring platform retains the 
profiles of all job applicants and uses that data internally; whenever the 
applicant applies again for a job, even if it is a different job from the initial 
attempt, this applicant profile is revived and data from it once again becomes 
the basis for a rejection. This result is unfair for various reasons. First, the 
continued retention and use of applicant profiles misappropriates applicant 
data — when applicants submit an application, they intend for the information 
they provide to be used solely for establishing their fitness for the target job 
position. It is not commonly understood that applicant data submitted at one 
moment in time could once again, potentially many years later, be used as 
evidence of whether an applicant is fit for another job. Second, retention and 
re-use of an applicant profile deny the applicant a chance to present himself in 
a manner that is more competitive for the job. For example, the applicant 
could have achieved tangible assets like a new credential, or have attained less 
quantifiable attributes such as better communication skills.  
 Further exacerbating the problem is that there are no laws prohibiting 
automated hiring platforms from selling applicant data. This means that 
applicant data created for one specific employer could be transported for the 
use of a completely different employer. Consequently, an applicant rejected by 
one employer could also, without leave to submit amendments to their profile, 
continue to be rejected by multiple employers.  
 I term this type of exclusion “algorithmic blackballing.” The algorithmic 
blackballing of applicants thwarts the goals of antidiscrimination law. While an 
applicant may not be right for a specific job at a specific point in time, using 
the same information that underlies that determination and applying it to a 
different job, even if at the same company, is antithetical to the bedrock legal 
doctrine of equal opportunity for all job applicants. 
F. The Employer’s Burden  
 Any opposition to my proposals will largely entail economic critiques 
centered on the cost to employers; however, those arguments ignore that the 
overarching aim of employment antidiscrimination law is to preserve equal 
opportunity for all job applicants and that antidiscrimination imposes a duty 
on employers to work towards that end.393 It is true that audits cost both time 
 
392 Professors Rick Bales and Katherine Stone have argued: “The electronic resume 
produced by AI will accompany workers from job to job as they move around the 
boundaryless workplace.” Bales & Stone, supra note 60 at 3.  
393 Cf. SOLON BAROCAS & HELEN NISSENBAUM, Big Data’s End Run Around Anonymity and 
Consent, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 
44, 44 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014) (noting that “where these data commit to record details 
about human behavior, they have been perceived as a threat to fundamental values, including 
everything from autonomy, to fairness, justice, due process, property, solidarity, and, perhaps 
most of all, privacy”). 
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and money, so employers could argue that mandated audits pose an undue 
economic burden and would negate the cost-saving benefits of automated 
hiring. However, as legal scholars like Professor Charles Sullivan have 
recognized: “antidiscrimination laws do not require shareholder value 
maximization. . . . The statutes do accommodate productivity concerns by 
allowing neutral practices with a disparate impact to be justified by business 
necessity.”394 
 
 Professor Richard Thompson Ford’s position 395  even more forcefully 
supports the argument for employers to shoulder the burden of checking for 
bias in algorithmic hiring systems. Ford argues that employment 
discrimination law 
 
imposes a duty of care on employers to avoid decisions that undermine 
social equality...we could better improve employment discrimination 
law—making it more successful as an egalitarian intervention and less 
intrusive on legitimate employer prerogatives—if we abandoned 
attempts to precisely define concepts such as “objective causation” and 
“discriminatory intent” and instead focused on refining the employer’s duty of 
care to avoid antiegalitarian employment decisions.396 
 
 If, as Ford argues, employment discrimination law already imposes a duty 
of care on employers to ensure that their employment decisions are not 
discriminatory, then calling for mandated audits of algorithmic hiring systems 
does not impose a new burden; rather, it merely delineates exactly how that 
duty of care should be fulfilled. Mandated audits are in keeping with the duty 
of care to verify that employment decisions are not unlawfully discriminatory. 
Moreover, self-audits need not be prohibitively costly. If, as I detail in Section 
IV.C.2, the automated hiring system has already been designed in such a way 
to retain and easily produce the information needed for the audits, the process 
of conducting self-audits should in reality pose no added economic burden. I’ll 
also note here that given that there is already a legal obligation for employers 
to engage in collective bargaining, the proposals discussed here could be part 
of that process and thus should not incur additional expense.  
CONCLUSION 
 In a previous article, I detailed how automated hiring has been perceived 
as a panacea for human bias in employment decision-making.397 However, as 
I argued in this article, automated hiring may in actuality represent a misguided 
Gordian knot approach to the systemic problem of employment 
discrimination. As automated decision-making cannot be fully disentangled 
from human decision-making, the former action cannot then be an antidote 
for the noxious effects of the latter. The human hand, and its attendant bias, 
 
394 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 398 n.12. 
395 See BIAS IN THE AIR, supra note 25. 
396 Id. (emphasis added). 
397 See Ajunwa, supra note 6. 
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remains present in automated decision-making. One concern then is that 
automated hiring represents a Trojan horse;398 although it appears as a time- 
and money-saving gift to corporations inundated by a deluge of job 
applications, in reality, it may conceal amplified bias and replicate unlawful 
discrimination, all disguised as artificial intelligence. The problems with 
automated hiring as identified elude the parameters of litigation redress 
mechanisms. This is true especially when considering the onerous proof 
requirements of antidiscrimination law. Thus, to enjoy any benefits of 
automated hiring systems, without further exacerbating the existing problem 
of bias, I advocate for a hybrid approach that deploys mechanisms from labor 
law and administrative law. This first necessitates the recognition of an auditing 
imperative as part of an employer’s affirmative duty of care. To fulfill such an 
auditing imperative demands record-keeping and data-retention mandates, 
including ex ante non-adversarial interventions, such as collective bargaining, 
to set the standards for data collection. Working in tandem, these proposed 
measures will get us closer as a society to the American ideal of equal 







398 My thanks to Professor Ryan Calo for noting this particular analogy during my paper 
workshop at the Privacy Law Scholars Conference. 
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APPENDIX 
 










ADP Workforce Now 2009 -More than 20,000 
clients by 2011 
• Presents candidate data in 
proprietary dashboard 
• “Benchmarking” insights 
used to determine 
compensation etc.; bills 
data as “decision-quality” 
ApplicantPro 2007 -Goodwill 
-JC Resorts 
-New York State 
Psychiatric Institute 
• Automated screening 
• Integrated behavioral 
assessments 
• Integrated background 
checks 
• Automated tracking of 
compliance data 
Arya (LeoForce) 2013 ??? • Purports to be “unbiased” 
on company website 
• Mimics searches of 
company’s most successful 
recruiters 
• Automated sourcing 
• Predicts whether 
candidates are likely to 
move jobs 
• Data includes things like 
“growth in the companies 
they have worked for” 
Ascentis ~2007? -Bel Brands USA 
-BevMo! 
-Calibre 









• Advertises itself as defense 
to discrimination lawsuits 
and seeks to automate 
EEO/OFCCP compliance 
• Social media integration 
• Can track demographic 
trends in applicant 
sourcing 







• Predicts recruiting success 
with psychometrics 
• Can pre-select candidates 
• Algorithm compares job 
profile to candidate profiles 
to source applicants 
 
399 My thanks to my research assistants, Eric Liberatore, Jane Kim, and Kayleigh Yerdon 
who all contributed to this table.  
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-AgChoice Farm Credit 
• Screening and scoring 
features 
• Tracks jobseeker activity 
• Background check 
integration 






-Optima Tax Relief 
-Surgical Specialties 
Corporation 
• Automated screening and 
scoring 
• Integrated drug testing and 
background check results 










-Johnson & Johnson 
-SweetIQ 




• Pre-recorded applicant 
video interviews 
• Standardized guides for 
interviewing and scoring 
quantify (and therefore 
“justify”) subjective 
evaluations 
• Sources candidates based 
on where recruiters 
previously sourced 
• Generates EEO/OFCCP 
compliance report, which 
could be problematic  
Bullhorn 1999 -Vet2Tech 
-The Chatham Group 
-Perma-Seal 











• Predictive intelligence 
suggests who to contact, 
when to contact them, and 
how to take action 
• Captures info from the 
Web to source candidates  
• Encourages “run[ning] 
your business by the 
numbers” 











• Predictive performance 
data and quality of hire 
reports 
• Pre-recorded video 
interviewing 
• Enables text messaging 
with candidates, then 
attaches those 
conversations to profile 
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• Automates background 
and reference checks; can 
make authorizations less 
explicit 
• Passive candidate sourcing 
• Gives current employees 
referral tools 
• Lets users organize 
applicants by any metric 
• Comes with automatic 
“interview guides” to 
suggest what should be 
asked 
• One-click background 
check 






• Suggests “appropriate” 
candidates 
• Resume parsing 












• Assessment analytics 
• App guides interviewers 
• Sourcing includes social 
media profiles 
COMPAS for Staffing 2008 -TEEMA 
-Cypress 
-Talener 
-David Aplin Group 
• Assessments 
• Recruiting intelligence 
analytics 
• Social integration 
• Automated sourcing 
Crelate Talent 2012 ??? • Detailed candidate profiles 
• Candidate analytics in 
reports 
• Generates EEO/OFCCP 
compliance report, which 
could be problematic 
• Prescreening questions 












• Predicts best candidates 
using hundreds of variables 
• Candidate social media 
automatically available 
• Predicts whether currently 
employed candidates are 
likely to move 
• While it allows users to 
sort candidates from 
underrepresented groups 
to the top, that also implies 
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a user could sort those 
candidates out 
Exelare 1999 -Arrow International 
-Global Rhymes 
-ERIMAX 




• Resume harvesting 
Firefish 2010 -Nine Twenty 






• Color-codes candidates to 
rank them 
• Records all communication 
with candidates, from text 
to VOIP, for everyone in 
company to use 



















• AI “stack ranks” 
candidates and sends 
personalized messages 
• Auto-scores screening, 
allowing people with no 
technical knowledge to 
evaluate performance on 
technical tasks 
• One-way video 
interviewing 
• Tracks if candidates 
opened emails 








-Golden State Warriors 
-Lyft 
-J.D. Power 
• Attempts to standardize 
interviews with “interview 
kits” 
• Tracks to generate insights 
on candidates 
• “Data-driven hiring” 
• Compares company hiring 










-Wabash Valley Power 
-Bluestone Properties 
• Social media integration 
• Screening and scoring 
• Integrated background 
checks 
• Touts compliance 
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-Central Restaurant 
Products 












-Atlanta Public Schools 
-Carnival 













































• Predictive people analytics 
• Uses “video intelligence” 
to make automated 
assessments based off 
video interviews (verbal 
response, intonation, 
nonverbal communication, 
and other data) and predict 
skills, fit, and performance 
• Micro-facial analysis for 
traits such as veracity and 
trustworthiness 
• Acquired MindX 
(psychometric games) to 
further develop assessment 
capabilities 
• Structured interviews 
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Hyrell 2007 -City of Pittsfield (MA) 
-NFSTC 





• Pre-scores applicants 
• Provides analytics on 
applicants 






















• Automated communication 
with candidates 
• Recruits through social 
media; applying via 
Facebook means they can 
access candidate’s 
Facebook 
• Facilitates employee 
referrals, reinforcing 
historical hiring patterns 
• Screening and assessment 
results 






• Like many, automates 
some communication 
• Guided interviews 
• Evaluation templates with 
automated scoring 





• Pre-screening and sorting 
based on answers 
• Can refine by geography, 
education, and “other” 
• Automates resume sorting 








• Finds personal emails and 
mobile phone numbers for 
candidates, even if they 
didn’t apply with them 
• Also finds professional 
history, even if not 
disclosed 
• Uses “Big Data” to source 
and qualify candidates 
• Brands on speed — “20x 
faster” 
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• ROI analytics on applicant 
sources 
• Employee referral 
integration 
• Social media integration 
• Automated compliance 
• Standardized 
interviewing/templates 
• Turns resumes into 
weighted scores 
• Sorts interviewed 
candidates by “thumbs 
up/down” rankings 
• Claims to reduce hiring risk 
with data that originates 
with a ranked list of what 
the company finds 
important 
Jobsoid 2013 -Shift Technology 
-Destinations of the 
World 





-Voglis Co. Ltd. 
-English Lakes Hotels, 
Resorts and Venues 
-BiOZEEN 




• Social integration 
• Sourcing with “advanced 
intelligence” 
• Interview scoring 
• Video screening 













• Referral emphasis 
• Filters out candidates 
• Emphasizes time and costs 
saved 
• One-way video for 
recorded assessments 












• Automated sourcing 
• Assessments built-in 
• Predictions and 
recommendations 
• Encourages fast decisions 
as “data-driven” 
• Features to automate 
nurturing top talent 
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• Predicts candidate interest 
in company/industry, how 
candidates will work with 
current employees, and 
who would relocate 
• Tracks LinkedIn user 
searches, connections, 
follows, publications, and 
likes to generate data for 
recruiters 
• Uses factors like candidate 
city or school in reports on 
how to find talent 





-The Carolan Group 
-Indigo Partners 
-Dental Team Finder 
• Finds personal contact info 
on candidates 
• Automates sourcing 
Mya 2017 -Adecco Group • Automates sourcing, 
screening, and scheduling 
• Sends data from 
“conversations” directly to 
ATS 
• Machine learning means 
her interactions are based 
on past candidates 
• Can only interact with 
candidates who apply 
online; thus, candidates 
who apply in-person 
cannot be hired 
Newton 2009 ??? • Built-in EEO/OFCCP 









-Marks & Spencer 
-UK Civil Service 
• Claims to eliminate bias by 
automating every step 
• Prescriptive hiring 
recommendations 
• Clients can apply via social 
profiles 
• Sorting in/out based on 
skills 
• Auto-scoring of applicants 
Olivia (Paradox) 2017 -CVS Health 
-Staples 
-Sprint 
-Delta Air Lines 
-DXC Technology 
-Alorica 
• Assistive intelligence 
recruiting assistant that 
“talks” to interested 
candidates and creates data 
on them 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3437631
9 
The Auditing Imperative for Automated Hiring Systems - Active Draft 
-Pilot Flying J • Machine learning means 
her interactions are based 
on past candidates 


















• Social media and referral 
sourcing 











• Integrates recruiting 




• Vendor Management 
Software gives control over 
contingent/contract labor 











• Automatically ranks 
candidates 
• Will soon automate 
searching for top talent 












• Imports passive candidates 
from social media sites 
• Can set default reasons for 
disqualification 





• Prospecting of candidates 
• Assessment templates 
Recruiterflow 2017 -FusionCharts 
-Ixigo 




• Structured interviewing 
and scoring 
• Automated sourcing 
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• Online reference-checking 
• Claims predictive 
technology reduces bias 
• Physician peer-referencing 
online (unique service) 
• Automates tracking of 
pipeline candidates 









• Metrics aim to focus 
recruiting to historically 
effective sources 
• Assessment tools 
• Measures performance and 
fit 
• Aims to make interviewing 
“objective” with scorecards 
(yet this merely quantifies 
subjective assessments) 
Talenthire (CEIPAL) 2013 ??? • Social media integration 
• Vendor management 
integration for contingent 
labor 
• Target sourcing 









• Screening questions for 
applicants, sortable by 
candidate answers 
• ROI-driven analytics 
discourage innovative 
recruiting 












• AI texting/online 
messaging chatbot 
performs “sentiment 
analysis” to determine 
candidate satisfaction 
during conversations (also 
does this for current 
employees) 
• Integrates with ATS 
VidCruiter 2009 -Liberty Mutual 
-Axiom Law 
-KIPP 
-University of Hawai‘i 
at Mānoa 
-IT Convergence 
• Automates interviewing 
with one-way video using 
predetermined questions 
• Automatically ranks 
candidates based on pre-
recorded interviews 
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• Website advertises that it 
“protect[s]” from 
discrimination lawsuits by 
using structured interviews 
• Partnered with Checkr 
(background check app) to 
give immediate background 
check reports right in the 
recruitment platform 
• Specifically promotes 
ability to see what 
candidates look like before 
interviewing 
• Gamification of skills 
testing (“engag[ing],” 
“interesting”) 





• Attempts to use behavioral 
science to determine 
cultural fit 
• Ranks on personality, in 
addition to assessments of 
skills, experience, and 
education 














• Sourcing tool aggregates 
social profile data to create 
candidate profiles 
• Facilitates employee 
referrals 
• Structured interviews and 
scorecards 
Workday 2005 -Cannot determine 
which companies 
specifically use the 
recruiting module of 
Workday, just 
companies that use any 
Workday module 
• Import social media 
profiles 
• Encourages shifting of 
talent spending to what 
software determines is 
working 
• Top-talent focus 
Workpop 2014 -Fresh Brothers 





• Automated sourcing 
• Algorithm based on 
millions of applications 
sets starting bids for each 
position on job boards 
• Grows applicant pool by 
having applicants add co-
workers as references; the 
references themselves are 
then in the pool 
• Automates rankings of 
candidates with Smart 
Rank 
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Zoho Recruit 1996 -DreamWorks 
-Manning Global 
-Columbia University 









of London Qatar 
• Social media candidate 
sourcing 
• Allows reformatting of 
parsed resumes; can delete 
candidate resume 
information before sharing 
with rest of company 
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Table 2: Strategies for Beating Automated Hiring Platforms 
 
Method Description 
“Key Word” Usage Look at employer’s job description and try to include in 
your resume as many of the exact buzz words it uses. 
Avoid synonyms — use exact language.400 
Avoid Over-Complication These systems can get confused by over-complication 
(including fancy fonts, colors, and graphics), so they will 
not select a resume if it contains these elements.401 
Follow-Up People are sorted out of AHPs so often that recruiters may 
not know which candidates are genuinely interested and 
which simply “dropped” their resumes there. If you are 
genuinely interested, one of the best ways to beat the AHP 
is to follow up with a recruiter via LinkedIn or other 
sites.402  
Relevant Keywords Keywords are rated higher by algorithms when they appear 
in a relevant paragraph (with related text), so if you can 
add this to your resume in a section about your 
accomplishments, you should.403 
Use Free Screening Tools Applicants can check to see how well their resume will 
scan by using free sites like jobscan.com.404 
Full Titles and Acronyms Some AHPs will look for the acronym of a 
title/certification (CPA, for example), while others will 
look for the spelled-out form of the title (Certified Public 
Accountant). Be sure to include both on your resume.405 
Avoid Spelling Mistakes Many AHPs will terminate your application immediately if 
you have spelling mistakes, because they will not 
understand what you’re trying to say.406 
Avoid Headers and 
Footers 
Headers and footers will “jam” algorithms, meaning that 
the algorithm will not be able to process your resume 
further. Avoid these!407 
 
400 See Trudy Steinfeld, Decoding the Job Search: How to Beat the ATS (Applicant Tracking System), 
FORBES (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/trudysteinfeld/2016/05/31/decoding-the-job-search-how-
to-beat-the-ats-applicant-tracking-system/ [https://perma.cc/98L9-LQPW]. 
401 See id. 
402 See id. 
403 See How to Beat Automated Resume Screening, WORKOPOLIS (June 28, 2017), 
https://careers.workopolis.com/advice/beat-automated-resume-screening/ 
[https://perma.cc/H28G-VH5R]. 
404 See id. 
405 See Regina Borsellino, Beat the Robots: How to Get Your Resume Past the System & Into Human 
Hands, MUSE, https://www.themuse.com/advice/beat-the-robots-how-to-get-your-resume-
past-the-system-into-human-hands [https://perma.cc/NG3L-J7FC]. 
406 See id. 
407 See Peter Cappelli, How to Get a Job? Beat the Machines, TIME (June 11, 2012), 
http://business.time.com/2012/06/11/how-to-get-a-job-beat-the-
machines/[https://perma.cc/U8VK-XHFT]. 
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Submit Resume in Text 
Format 
While many people opt to send their resumes in PDF 
format, this leaves the parser open to making more errors. 
Typically, the easiest format for the scanner to read is in 
Text Format.408 
Include Postal Address Most scanners will automatically screen out your resume if 
it does not include a postal address. Just remember — 
don’t include this information in a header or footer, as it 
will not be screened!409 
Pay Attention to Font Avoid serif fonts (such as Times New Roman), because 
some screeners reject resumes with these fonts.410  
Stick to “Orthodox” 
Sections 
Name your sections “Work Experience” and “Education” 
instead of “Career Achievements” or “Training,” because 
AHPs are trained to search for specific information under 
specific sections (usually, Education, Work Experience, 
Skills and Contact Information).411  
Apply Early Some AHPs charge employers by the applicant, so it’s 
cheaper for companies to review the first 50 applicants 
than to review every applicant who applies. Thus, late 
applicants are sometimes discarded without even being 
screened.412 
Be Average on Personality 
Tests 
“Score somewhere between the 40th and 60th percentiles” 
and “try to answer as if you were like everybody else is 
supposed to be.” Basically, try to answer questions in the 
most average way possible.413 
 
408 See id. 
409 See Pamela Skillings, How to Get the Applicant Tracking System to Pick Your Resume, BIG 
INTERVIEW (Mar. 2015), https://biginterview.com/blog/2015/03/applicant-tracking-
system.html [https://perma.cc/YB9D-MWDW]. 
410 See Melanie Pinola, Format Your Resume So It Gets Past Applicant Screening Software, 
LIFEHACKER (Feb. 26, 2013, 2:00 PM), https://lifehacker.com/5987055/format-your-
resume-so-its-compatible-with-applicant-screening-software [https://perma.cc/4VBA-
YQCJ]. 
411 See Richard Poulin, Is Your Resume Ready for Automated Screening?, LINKEDIN (Mar. 10, 
2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/your-resume-ready-automated-screening-richard-
poulin/ [https://perma.cc/NWV9-FD2Y]. 
412 See id. 
413 See WILLIAM H. WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN 405 (2002). 
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When Asked for Word 
Associations… 
“When asked for word associations or comments about 
the world, give the most conventional, run-of-the-mill, 
pedestrian answer possible.”414 
Incline to Conservatism When asked about your values on personality tests, read 
closely through all questions to look for patterns. In some 
tests, the “right” or “most conservative” answers will be 
located in the same multiple-choice position for each 
question.415 
When it Comes to 
Hypothetical Judgment 
Questions, Don’t Reflect 
Many personality tests include hypothetical situations that 
are followed by questions about how the respondent 
would act if faced with that scenario. Research has shown 
that it is best not to reflect on the question before 
answering, and that respondents should answer as quickly 
as they can to avoid giving off the sense that they are 
confused about what steps they would take.416 
Add Buzz Words in White 
Ink 
To “trick” the algorithm into sorting you through, some 
applicants have suggested including more buzz words 
throughout their resumes, but in white ink so that they are 
not visible to the human eye. Thus, their application will 
be automatically screened into the “yes” pile without 






414 See id. 
415 See id. at 408. 
416 See id. at 409. 
417 See Osas Obaiza, Hack Your Resume to Fool Keyword-Hunting Robots & Land Yourself More 
Interviews (The Evil Way), WONDER HOW TO (May 16, 2013, 2:16 PM), https://jobs-
resumes.wonderhowto.com/how-to/hack-your-resume-fool-keyword-hunting-robots-land-
yourself-more-interviews-the-evil-way-0146824/ [https://perma.cc/G994-AA6C]. 
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